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WARRANTLESS INVESTIGATIVE SEIZURES AND SEARCHES
OF AUTOMOBILES AND THEIR CONTENTS AND OCCUPANTS
Steven G. Davison *

INTRODUCTION

Although the prohibition under the fourth amendment to the
United States Constitution I of any search or seizure that is unreasonable 2
has been interpreted by the United States Supreme Court as generally
requiring police to obtain a warrant prior to conducting a search or
seizure,3 numerous exceptions to this rule have been recognized 4 when
the "exigencies of the situation" make a warrantless search or seizure
"imperative. "5 Warrantless seizures and searches of automobiles 6 have
been permitted by the courts in a number of situations. Warrantless
·B.S., 1968, Cornell University. J.D., 1971, Yale University. Professor of Law, University of
Baltimore School of Law. Member, Colorado Bar.
I. The fourth amendment of the United States Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CaNsT., amend. IV.
2. Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 357 (1931).
3. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).
4. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
5. McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 456 (1948).
6. Certain inspections and examinations of automobiles and their contents do not constitute a
"search" or "seizure" within the meaning of the fourth amendment. For the conduct of governmental agents to constitute a fourth amendment "search" or "seizure," the conduct must violate a
person's actual (subjective) expectation of privacy. This subjective expectation of privacy must be
one that the court believes society recognizes as "justifiable," "reasonable," or "legitimate."
United States v. Knotts, 103 S. Ct. 1081 (1983) (use of electronic "beeper" to monitor movement of
automobile on public streets and highways held not to be a fourth amendment search); Smith v.
Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979) (use of pen register device, which records the numbers dialed by a
telephone but does not intercept the contents of telephone conversations, held not to be a fourth
amendment search); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (interception of contents of a persons's conversation on a telephone in a public telephone booth, by placing an electronic listening
device on the outside of the booth, held to be a fourth amendment search). If police conduct is not a
fourth amendment search or seizure under this two-pronged test, such conduct is not subject to the
warrant, probable cause, or reasonableness requirements of the fourth amendment. Smith v.
Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
Whether particular police conduct violates a justifiable, reasonable or legitimate expectation of
privacy is determined to a great extent by the subjective judgment of a judge deciding a particular
case. See W. LA FAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT §§ 2.1-2.7
(1978). It should be noted, however, that in making this determination the Supreme Court has con-
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sidered facts that establish that members of the public may have knowledge or reason to know that
police or other persons may engage in the type of conduct that is being challenged as a search or
seizure. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735. In this case, the Supreme Court considered whether
members of the public would know or have reason to know whether a telephone company records
telephone numbers dialed on a person's telephone in determining whether such conduct by a
telephone company at the request of the police constituted a fourth amendment search. The Court
did not limit its inquiry to whether members of the public would know or have reason to know that
the police would record the numbers dialed from a person's telephone. But if a person's justifiable,
reasonable, or legitimate expectation of privacy is violated by the conduct of private persons and not
by the conduct of governmental agents, the fourth amendment is not implicated. See C.
WHITEBREAD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: AN ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL CASES AND CONCEPTS §
4.02 (1980). The Supreme Court has not, however, decided whether public opinion surveys or expert
testimony indicating whether members of the public would consider particular conduct by police or
other persons to violate a justifiable, reasonable, or legitimate expectation of privacy, can be or
should be considered by a judge in determining whether such conduct is a fourth amendment search
or seizure.
Because tlie determination of whether a particular type of police conduct violates a justifiable,
reasonable, or legitimate expectation of privacy is to a great extent a subjective judgment by the
judges deciding a particular case, judges often disagree as to whether a particular type of police conduct violates a justifiable, reasonable, or legitimate expectation of privacy. E.g., compare United
States v. Shelby, 573 F .2d 971 (7th Cir. 1978), and People v. Krivda, 5 Cal. 3d 357, 96 Cal. Rptr. 62,
486 P.2d 12~2 (1971), vacated and remanded, 409U.S. 33 (1972), a/I'd, 8 Cal. 3d 623,105 Cal. Rptr.
521, 504 P .2d 457 (1973) (disagreement as to whether inspection of trash that has been set out on the
curb of a public street is a fourth amendment search).
Under this two-pronged test for defining a search or seizure, courts hold that police do not
engage in a fourth amendment search when they look through a window of an automobile that is in a
public place and observe what is inside the automobile, e.g., Smith v. Slayton, 484 F.2d 1188 (4th
Cir. 1973), !!ven if the observations are made in the evening or night with the aid of a flashlight. E.g.,
State v. Bell, 62 Wis. 2d 534, 215 N.W. 2d 535 (1974); Marshall v. United States, 422 F.2d 185 (5th
Cir. 1970). A search may be held to occur, however, if police open the door of an automobile and
observe its contents, Tyler v. United States, 302 A.2d 748 (D.C. App. 1973), break into and enter a
locked automobile and inspect its interior and contents, State v. Simpson, 95 Wash. 2d 170,622 P.
2d 1199 (1980), or trespass onto private property and observe the interior and contents of an
automobile that is parked within the curtilage. United States v. Bradshaw, 490 F.2d 1097 (4th Cir.
1974). A fourth amendment search, however, may not occur if police, although trespassing onto
private property, are in an "open field" area rather than within the curtilage when they look into the
interior of an automobile. See Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924); Air Pollution Variance
Bd. v. Western Alfalfa Corp., 416 U.S. 861 (1974).
Police have also been held not to engage in a fourth amendment search or seizure when they
examine the exterior of an automobile that is located in a public place and take a small sample of the
automobile's paint and an impression of the tread of a tire mounted on the automobile. Cardwell v.
Lewis, 417 U.S. 583 (1974) (plurality opinion).
On the other hand, no fourth amendment seizure or search occurs if police impound and inspect
the interior and contents of an automobile that has been abandoned. See W. LA FAVE, supra note 6,
§ 2.5(a).
Furthermore, even if police conduct in impounding and inspecting an automobile constitutes a
search or seizure that violates one person's fourth amendment rights, such conduct may not violate
the fourth amendment rights of other persons. A defendant in a criminal trial has standing to
challenge the admissibility of information obtained or items seized by police on the grounds that the
information or items were obtained as a result of ail illegal search or seizure only if the illegal search
or seizure violated his own personal fourth amendment rights (by violating an actual and legitimate
expectation of privacy). A person cannot, however, challenge the admissibility of items or information obtained by police in violation of a third person's constitutional rights. Rakas v. Illinois, 439
U.S. 128 (1978) (a passenger in an automobile that he does not own generally does not have standing
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searches of automobiles are permitted when voluntarily consented 7 to
either by the automobile's owner or by another person with common
authority over or other sufficient relationship to the automobile. 8
under the fourth amendment to challenge a search of that automobile and the seizure of items that he
does not own); United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727 (1980) (defendant in a criminal trial does not
have standing under the fourth amendment to challenge the admissibility of evidence taken from a
third person through an intentional violation of that third person's fourth amendment rights). Cf.
United States v. Posey, 663 F.2d 37 (7th Cir. 1981) (defendant had "standing" to challenge search of
automobile and seizure of guns discovered in an automobile owned by his wife because he was
exercising exclusive control over the automobile pursuant to her permission at the time of the
search, even though he admittedly had no property interest in either the automobile searched or the
guns seized).
In addition, although evidence obtained either directly or indirectly in violation of a person's
fourth amendment rights will not be admissible as evidence at that person's criminal trial under the
exclusionary rule, Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), or under the corollary "fruit of the poisonous
tree" doctrine, Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963); Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590
(1975), such evidence may be admissible in a grand jury proceeding, United States v. Calandra, 414
U.S. 338 (1974), and in a civil administrative proceeding. United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976).
See also Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976) (state prisoner may not bring federal habeas corpus
suit alleging that evidence admitted at his state criminal trial was inadmissible because obtained in
violation of the fourth amendment of the United States Constitution, when state prisoner had full
and fair opportunity to litigate his fourth amendment claim in the state courts).
The Fifth Circuit has adopted a "good faith" exception to the exclusionary rule, under which
an illegally-obtained item is not suppressed if the police officers who seized the item were acting in
good faith and under a reasonable, although mistaken, belief that their actions were lawful. United
States v. Williams, 622 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1980) (per curiam en banc), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1127
(1981). This Fifth Circuit exception is applicable both when police make an error of judgment concerning the existence of facts establishing probable cause and when police rely on a statute later held
to be unconstitutional, a warrant later held to be invalid, or a court decision that is subsequently
overruled. United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d at 840-46. But in order for this Fifth Circuit exception
to apply, the prosecution must establish both the existence of actual, bona fide good faith in the
police officers in question at the time of the disputed search and seizure, and the reasonableness of
this good faith on an objective basis. Id. at 843. This exception was justified on the grounds that the
cost to society of freeing a gUilty person outweighed any slight deterrence of illegal acts by individual
police officers that would result from excluding evidence obtained by police officers acting in good
faith.ld. at 840. See United States v. Alvares-Porras, 643 F.2d 54 (2d Cir. 1981). Cf. Abell v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 607, 272 S.E.2d 204 (1980). In a recent case, the Supreme Court, on its own
motion, ordered the parties on reargument to address the question of whether the exclusionary rule
"should to any extent be modified, so as, for example, not to require the exclusion of evidence
obtained in the reasonable belief that the search and seizure at issue was consistent with the Fourth
Amendment." Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 436 (1982). The Court in Gates, however, ultimately
decided the case on other grounds, declining to address the question of whether a "good faith"
exception to the exclusionary rule should be adopted because the issue had not been presented to or
addressed by the state courts below and no factual record relevant to this question had been
developed in the state courts below. Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 2317 (1983).
The Supreme Court might recognize a "good faith" exception to the exclusionary rule on the
grounds that the purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter similar unlawful police conduct in the
future, Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976), and that this purpose is not furthered significantly by
excluding evidence seized in violation of the fourth amendment by police who were acting in good
faith. See Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974).
7. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
8. Statev. Farrell, 443 A.2d438 (R.I. 1982). Cf. United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164 (1974).
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Automobiles lawfully impounded by the police may be searched without
a warrant when the search is conducted pursuant to standard police procedures and for the purposes of safeguarding the owner's property and
protecting the safety of the police and public. 9 There also exists some
authority indicating that automobiles may be seized and searched
without a warrant when there is probable cause to believe that the
automobile is evidence of a crime. 10 The courts have also permitted warrantless seizures and searches of automobiles and their contents under the
"automobile exception" (also called the "Carroll doctrine" II), which
permits a warrantless seizure and search of an automobile and certain of
its contents when police have probable cause to believe that it contains
seizable items and circumstances make the obtaining of a warrant
impracticable. 12 In the last twelve years, the United States Supreme
Court has decided a number of cases involving the automobile
exception. 13 In two recently decided cases, Robbins v. California l4 and
United States v. Ross, I' a deeply divided Court addressed the issue of the
permissible scope of a search of luggage and other containers discovered
in an automobile lawfully searched under the automobile exception. In
New York v. Belton, 16 a case decided at the same time as Robbins, the
Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision, adopted a rule separate from and independent of the automobile exception. This is aper se rule permitting the
warrantless search of the interior of the passenger compartment of an
automobile and of containers found therein when incident to the lawful
arrest of the occupants of the automobile. The Supreme Court also
recently held that police, when conducting an investigation of an
automobile that has been lawfully stopped for a traffic violation or that
has been involved in an accident, may make a warrantless search of areas
of the passenger compartment of the automobile and containers therein
in which a weapon could be placed or hidden, if the police possess a
reasonable belief that a non-arrested suspect is potentially dangerous and
may gain immediate control of a weapon. 17
9. South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 368-72 (1976).
10. See W. LA FAVE, supra note 6, § 7.3(a).
11. See infra note 150.
12. See infra notes 150-321 and accompanying text.
13. Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443
(1971); Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583 (1974); Texas v. White, 423 U.S. 67 (1975); Arkansas v.
Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979); Colorado v. Bannister, 449 U.S. 1 (1980); Robbins v. California,
453 U.S. 420 (1981); United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982); Michigan v. Thomas, 102 S.
Ct. 3079 (1982); Texas v. Brown, 103 S. Ct. 1535 (1983).
14. 453 U.S. 420 (1981).
15. 456 U.S. 798 (1982).
16. 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
17. Michigan v. Long, 51 U.S.L.W. 5231 (U.S. June 28, 1983). See infra note 145.
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This article will analyze exceptions to the general rule requiring a
warrant for the seizure and search of an automobile and its contents and
occupants, giving particular attention to Robbins, Ross, and Belton.

I.

WARRANTLESS SEARCHES INCIDENT TO
LAWFUL ARRESTS: GENERAL PRINCIPLES

In the 1981 case of New York v. Belton, 18 the Supreme Court for the
first time explicitly addressed the issue of whether an automobile can be
searched by police without a warrant simply because an occupant of the
automobile has been lawfully arrested. 19 At issue in Belton was whether a
warrantless search of an automobile is permitted under the Chimel v.
Calijornia 20 exception to the general fourth amendment rule.
The Chimel exception permits police, without a warrant, to search
the area adjacent to a person lawfully arrested if the arrestee could lunge
or grasp for a weapon or for evidence that could be destroyed. 21 In
Chimel, after police had arrested the defendant in his home-an arrest
the Court assumed was lawfuF 2 -the police searched the entire home and
discovered incriminating evidence. This evidence was introduced at the
defendant's trial on two charges of burglary, and he was convicted. Overruling two earlier cases 23 that would have permitted the warrantless
search of the defendant's entire home, the Court held that a lawful war18. 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
19. See infra notes 59-149 and accompanying text.
20. 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
21. Id. at 763.
22. Id. at 755.
23. Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947); United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56
(1950). Harris had held that the warrantless search of the entire residential premises where the defendant had been lawfully arrested was a lawful search incident to the defendant's lawful arrest.
Rabinowitz had upheld, as a lawful search incident to a lawful arrest, an extensive warrantless
search of a one-room business office. Prior to Harris, however, in Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United
States, 282 U.S. 344 (1931), and United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452 (l932)-cases which
neither Harris nor Rabinowitz explicitly overruled-the Supreme Court had held unlawful the warrantless searches of the offices where the defendants had been lawfully arrested and the warrantless
seizure of evidence in the offices. The holdings in Go-Bart Importing Co. and Lefkowitz were based
on the Court's findings that the arresting officers had had sufficient information and time to obtain
a search warrant and that the areas searched and items seized were not visible and accessible and
were not in the arrestee's immediate custody. Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. at
358; United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. at 565. Furthermore, in Trupiano v. United States, 334
U.S. 699 (1948), a case decided subsequent to Harris and prior to Rabinowitz, the Court held that
the warrantless seizure of an illicit distillery found at the site where one defendant was lawfully
arrested was unlawful and could not be upheld as a search incident to a lawful arrest, because the
arresting officers had had more than enough time to obtain a warrant authorizing seizure of the
distillery. Trupiano distinguished Harris on the grounds that in Harris the police knew in advance of
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rantless search incident to a lawful arrest includes only the person of the
arrestee 24 and the area" 'within his immediate control' ... from within
the search where seizable evidence would be found. Rabinowitz, however, overruled Trupiano to the
extent that it required a search warrant based solely upon the practicality of procuring it rather than
upon the reasonableness of the search after the lawful arrest. In Chimel v. California, the Supreme
Court attempted to resolve the "divergent results" which had been reached in "various factual
situations." 395 U.S. at 760 n.4, citing other cases where "divergent results" were reached in
"various factual situations."
24. 395 U.S. at 762-63. This statement was technically dictum, because in Chimel no search of
the defendant's person occurred at the time of his arrest.
Subsequently, in United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973), and Gustafson v. Florida, 414
U.S. 260 (1973), the Court explicitly held that police, without a search warrant, may fully search the
person of an individual they have lawfully arrested for the purposes of seizing any weapons on his
person in order to take him into custody and preserving any evidence on his person for later use at
trial. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. at 234. The Court in these two cases held that a
warrantless search of the person of an individual lawfully arrested can be made every time a
person is lawfully arrested and taken into custody to the police station. United States v. Robinson,
414 U.S. at 234-35. (The reasons for adoption of this rule are discussed infra notes 84-86 and
accompanying text.)
This rule applies regardless of the triviality of the offense for which a person is arrested. Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. at 263-64. (In Gustafson, the defendant was arrested after being lawfully
stopped for failure to have his vehicle operator's license in his possession. In Robinson, the defendant was arrested after being lawfully stopped for driving after revocation of his operator's permit
and for obtaining an operator's permit by misrepresentation.) The right to search the person of one
lawfully arrested also does not require probable cause or even reasonable suspicion that the arrestee
is armed or has evidence on his person. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. at 235; Gustafson v.
Florida, 414 U.S. at 266. The Court also held that the police have the right to search the person of
one lawfully arrested even when the nature of the offense for which the person is arrested makes it
unlikely that the arrestee possesses a dangerous weapon, United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. at 234,
and even though there is no evidence that could be found on the arrestee's person relevant to the
offense for which the person is arrested. 414 U.S. at 233; Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. at 265. The
Supreme Court in Gustafson also held that the lawfulness of a search of the person of an individual
lawfully arrested does not depend upon whether the arresting officer is required by police regulations to take an arrestee into custody or whether there are police regulations or policies which
establish the conditions under which a full-scale body search can be conducted. 414 U.S. at 265. (The
Court, however, left open in Robinson the question of whether a warrantless search of the person of
an arrestee will be upheld if the arrest was a mere "pretext" for the search. 414 U.S. at 221 n.!. See
infra notes 114-18 and accompanying text.)
The Court in these two cases also held that a search of an arrestee's person is not limited to a frisk
(pat-down of a person's exterior clothing), United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. at 227-29, which can
only take place when police have a reasonable suspicion that a person is armed and presently
dangerous. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. I (1968); Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972); Pennsylvania
v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977); Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85 (1979). An officer conducting a frisk
can reach inside a person's exterior clothing only when he feels an item that he reasonably believes is
a weapon; in such a case he only can reach inside that person's clothing to seize the item he believes is
a weapon and cannot make a full-scale search of the individual's person. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. I
(1968). The Court in Robinson held that the search of an arrestee's person is not subject to the limitations of a frisk on the grounds that "it is scarcely open to doubt that the danger to an officer is far
greater in the case of the extended exposure which follows the taking of a suspect into custody and
transporting him to the police station than in the case of the relatively fleeting contact resulting from
the typical Terry-type stop. This is an adequate basis for treating all custodial arrests alike for purposes of search justification." 414 U.S. at 234-35. The only limits that the Supreme Court has
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imposed on the scope of a search of an arrestee's person are that a body search cannot be extreme or
patently abusive in violation of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. United States
v. Robinson, 414 U.S. at 236. See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952) (forcing enemetic solution through tube into stomach of arrestee to induce vomiting of swallowed drugs held to violate due
process clause).
In Robinson and Gustafson the Court also appeared implicitly to authorize police to open any
containers that they find on an arrestee's person and to seize and further investigate the contents of
such containers. See Robinson v. California, 414 U.S. at 236 (warrantless inspection of crumpled-up
cigarette package, and warrantless testing of 14 gelatin capsules containing white powder found in
package (later determined to contain heroin), upheld as search incident to lawful arrest); Gustafson
v. Florida, 414 U.S. at 266 (warrantless opening of cigarette box, and seizure of marijuana cigarettes
found inside box, upheld as search incident to lawful arrest). Subsequently, in United States v.
Chadwick, 433 U.S. I, 15 (1977), the Supreme Court indicated that personal property "immediately
associated with the person" can be searched without a warrant when incident to the lawful arrest of
that person. See infra notes 51-54 and accompanying text. See also New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. at
460-61, discussed infra notes 52, 59-149 and accompanying text. Chadwick appears to allow police
to open containers immediately associated with the person and found on an arrestee's person
without a warrant even though the police have gained exclusive control of the container, People v.
De Santis, 46 N.Y.2d 82, 412 N.Y.S.2d 838, 385 N.E.2d 577 (1978), and even though the police do
not have probable cause to believe that the container contains items that have a nexus with criminal
activity, such as fruits, instrumentalities, evidence of crime, or contraband. Cf. Warden v. Hayden,
387 U.S. 294 (1967). Thus, by appearing to authorize the police to seize the contents of containers
found on an arrestee's person even without probable cause to believe that the contents have a nexus
to criminal activity, Chadwick, Robinson and Gustafson, implicitly create an exception to the
"immediately apparent" requirement of the plain view seizure doctrine, which requires police,
when they first discover an item for which they were not searching, to have probable cause to believe
it has a nexus with criminal activity in order to seize the item without a warrant. See infra note 57.
Some lower courts, however, have prohibited police from opening an opaque, closed container
found on an arrestee's person and from seizing and further investigating its contents unless police
have probable cause to believe that the container contains items having a nexus with criminal activity. State v. Elkins, 245 Or. 279, 422 P.2d 250 (1966). Contra United States v. Simpson, 453 F.2d
1038 (lOth Cir. 1972); Wright v. Edwards, 343 F. Supp. 792 (N.D. Miss. 1972).
One reason for the holdings in Robinson and Gustafson that a search of an arrestee's person
can occur in all cases when the arrest is lawful and that the search's legality does not depend upon the
individual circumstances of each case is that "[aJ police officer's determination as to how and where
to search the person of a suspect whom he arrested is necessarily a quick ad hoc judgment which the
Fourth Amendment does not require to be broken down in each instance into an analysis of each step
in the search." United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. at 235. The Court also supported this rule on the
grounds that "a custodial arrest of a suspect based on probable cause is a reasonable intrusion under
the fourth amendment," and that, therefore, "a search incident to the arrest requires no additional
justification . . . because it is the fact of the lawful arrest which establishes the authority
to search. . . ." I d.
The Supreme Court has also indicated that the warrantless search of an arrestee's person can
take place prior to the actual arrest if the arrest follows "quickly on the heels" of the challenged
search of the arrestee's person and provided that probable cause for the arrest is not based upon
items found on the arrestee's person during the search that occurred prior to the arrest. Rawlings v.
Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98 (1980). Although not stated, the reason for this rule is probably to protect the
arresting officer's safety if the person being arrested happens to be armed with a weapon and
attempts to use it while the officer is placing him under custody. Cf. Holt v. Simpson, 340 F.2d 853,
856 (7th Cir. 1965) (' 'To hold differently would be to allow a technical formality of time to control
when there has been no real interference with the substantive rights of a defendant. ") Similarly, the
Supreme Court also has indicated that the warrantless search of an arrestee's person can take place
at the police station prior to or shortly after the incarceration of the arrestee. United States v.
Edwards, 415 U.S. 800 (1974). Cf. Illinois v. Lafayette, 51 U.S.L.W. 4829 (U.S. June 20, 1983)
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which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence.,,25
The Court in Chimel explained that the reason for allowing a search of an
arrestee's person and the area within his "immediate control" is to
remove any weapons that the arrestee "might seek to use to resist arrest
or to affect his escape," to avoid endangering the officer's safety and
frustrating the arrest,26 and to prevent the arrestee from concealing or
destroying evidence. 27 The Court further stated that "a gun on a table or
in a drawer in front of one who is arrested can be as dangerous to the
arresting officer as one concealed in the clothing of the person arrested.
There is ample justification, therefore, for a search of the arrestee's person and the area 'within his immediate control'-construing that phrase
to mean the area from within which he might gain possession of a weapon
or destructible evidence.' >28
In Chimel, however, the Court made it clear that a "lunge or grasp"
area search is limited to the area immediately adjacent to the spot at
which the defendant is arrested. 29 The police, for example, cannot arrest

(without a warrant, probable cause or reasonable suspicion, police may seize, examine, and inventory the contents of any container or article in the possession of a person under lawful arrest when
that person is being booked and jailed at a police station-house in accordance with routine and
established administrative procedures, for the purposes of protecting an arrestee's property from
theft, protecting police from false claims of theft, discovering dangerous instrumentalities in an
arrestee's possession, and verifying or ascertaining an arrestee's identity).
Of course, a person must have been lawfully arrested in order for the police to have the authority to make a warrantless search of his person. If the arrest is unlawful, any items found on the
arrestee's person will be excluded as evidence at the arrestee's criminal trial pursuant to the exclusionary rule. C. WHITEBREAD, supra note 6, § 6.02.
25. 395 U.S. at 763.
26. [d.
27. [d.
28. [d. In a subsequent case, United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1,14-15 (1977), discussed

infra notes 36-58 and accompanying text, the Court stated in dictum that a search of an arrestee is
also for the purpose of protecting persons other than the arresting officers, and that a warrantless
search under Chimel of the area within an arrestee's immediate control can be made "whether or not
there is probable cause to believe that the person arrested may have a weapon or is about to destroy
evidence. The potential dangers lurking in all custodial arrests make warrantless searches of items
within the 'immediate control' area reasonable without requiring the arresting officer to calculate
the probability that weapons or destructible evidence may be involved." 433 U.S. at 14-15. (Earlier
in the same opinion, the Court similarly stated that "when a custodial arrest is made, there is always
some danger that the person arrested may seek to use a weapon, or that evidence may be concealed or
destroyed." Id. at 14.) This approach is the same as that applicable to the search of an arrestee's person. As noted earlier, the person of an arrestee can be searched in every case regardless of whether
the officer has probable cause or a reasonable suspicion that the arrestee has a weapon or evidence
on his person, and regardless of how trivial or minor the offense for which a person is arrested. See
supra note 24.
29. The Court stated that "there is no comparable justification ... for routinely searching any
room other than that in which an arrest occurs .... " 395 U.S. at 763. Cf Washington v. Chrisman,
455 U.S. 1(1982).
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a person in his living room and then march that person through his home,
searching areas adjacent to his path. Furthermore, the area within which
the police can properly search is limited to that within which the arrestee
can physically lunge or grasp.30
The Chimel Court also made it clear that the scope of the area that is
within an arrestee's immediate control (and, therefore, that can be
searched without a warrant incident to a lawful arrest) depends upon
"the facts and circumstances-the total atmosphere of the case."3! A
number of factors are considered by a court in making this determination, 32 including the relative number of arrestees and arresting officers at
the place where the arrest occurs,33 the extent to which the arrestee is
physically restrained at the time of the search of the area,34 and the
physical size, strength, and skills ofthe arrestees compared to those ofthe
arresting officers. 35
In a subsequent case, United States v. Chadwick, 36 the Court placed
limitations on the right of police to open without a warrant and search
pieces of personal luggage discovered during a lawful search of the area
within an arrestee's immediate control. 37 In Chadwick, federal narcotics

30. In Chimel, the Court made this clear by referring to the area "in front of one who is
arrested," 395 U.S. at 763, and the area within the reach of the person arrested, id. at 766; and by
approvingly discussing, at 395 U.S. at 763-64, the Court's earlier decision in Preston v. United
States, 376 U.S. 364 (1964). The Court in Chimel approvingly quoted language in Preston to the
effect that a warrantless search of an automobile, after its occupants had been taken to jail and the
automobile had been towed to a garage, could not be upheld as a search incident to a lawful arrest,
because the search was remote from the place and not contemporaneous with the time of the arrest.
376 U.S. at 367.
In Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 14, the Court stated in dictum that a search under Chimelpermits a
"prompt" search of the area within an arrestee's "immediate control." The Chimel Court did not
discuss the question of whether a search of that area may occur prior to when the individual actually
is arrested. The Court subsequently held that the person of an arrestee may be searched without a
warrant prior to his being arrested. Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98 (1980). See supra note 24.
31. 395 U.S. at 765 (quoting United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 66 (1950».
32. See generally, W. LA FAVE, supra note 6, § 6.3(c).
33. E.g., United States v. Jones, 475 F.2d 723 (5th Cir. 1973); Peoplev. Williams, 57 Bl.2d 239,
311 N.E.2d 681 (1974).
34. Most courts hold that the area of immediate control is very limited when the arrestee's
hands are cuffed behind his back at the time of the search of the area adjacent to him. E.g., United
States v. Jones, 475 F.2d 723 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v. Boca, 417 F.2d 103 (10th Cir. 1969).
Some courts, however, hold that the fact that an arrestee has his hands cuffed in front of him does
not prohibit the police from searching the area adjacent to the arrestee. E.g., United States v. Jones,
475 F.2d 723 (5th Cir. 1973).
35. For example, the area within an arrestee's immediate control should be very small when the
arrestee is unconscious, quadraplegic, or paraplegic and not in a wheelchair.
36. 433 U.S. I (1977).
37. In Chadwick the Court did not itemize the types of containers and other items found on
an arrestee's person subject to its holding. See supra note 24 and infra. notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
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agents lawfully arrested three persons and seized a footlocker in their
possession. The agents had probable cause to believe that the footlocker
contained contraband marijuana or hashish. The arrestees were taken to
a federal building, and the footlocker was taken to another part of the
building. Subsequently, federal agents opened the locked footlocker
without a warrant and seized a large amount of marijuana.
The Court in Chadwick determined that the warrantless opening of
the footlocker could not be upheld under the fourth amendment as a
Chimel search of an area within an arrestee's immediate control. The
Court concluded that the fourth amendment protected the owners of the
footlocker against unreasonable warrantless searches and seizures, 38
because they had manifested an expectation that the contents would
remain free from public examination by placing the contents inside a
double-locked footlocker. 39
The Court then rejected the government's argument that the fourth
amendment's warrant requirement protects only private homes, business
offices, and private communications. It also rejected the argument that
searches of containers are reasonable under the fourth amendment
if there is probable cause to believe evidence of criminal conduct
is present. 40

38. The Court's opinion in Chadwick did not address the issue of whether all three arrestees
had standing to challenge the legality of the warrantless opening of the footlocker. See supra note 6.
The Court also stated that the fourth amendment "protects people from unreasonable governmental intrusions into their legitimate expectations of privacy." 433 U.S. at 7. Thus, the Court
implicitly found that the opening of the locked footlocker was a fourth amendment search. (A
search occurs when police conduct violates a person's actual and legitimate expectations of privacy.
See supra note 6. If police conduct is not a fourth amendment search, such conduct is not subject to
the warrant, probable cause, or reasonableness requirements of the fourth amendment. Smith v.
Maryland, 443 U.S. 735 (1979».
39. Although Chadwick's reference to double-locking the trunk could be interpreted as requiring such manifestations of privacy in order for a container to be protected by the fourth amendment,
the Court in United States v. Cleary, 656 F .2d 1302, 1303-04 (9th Cir. 1981), held that such a reading
of Chadwick would be incorrect in light of the subsequent decision in Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S.
753 (1979), analyzed infra notes 193-212 and accompanying text. In Cleary the Court noted that
Sanders, in including an unlocked suitcase within the category of personal property protected by the
fourth amendment, "did not rely on the types of precautions that indicate a subjective expectation
of privacy (i.e., double-locking) found in Chadwick. Rather, the critical factor relied on was the
objective nature of the suitcase as personal luggage, i.e., the inherent nature of the container itself
rather than the behavior of its owner." 656 F.2d at 1304. See infra note 47 and accompanying text.
Cleary was implicitly modified by United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982), which held that the
fourth amendment protects any container, whether "worthy" or "unworthy" (see infra note 224),
the contents of which are not open to plain view, regardless of whether there are any subjective
manifestations of privacy. See infra notes 250-321 and accompanying text.
40. 433 U.S. at 6-7. The Court rejected these arguments, stating that the warrant clause of the
fourth amendment' 'does not in terms distinguish between searches conducted in private homes and
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The Court further determined that the warrantless search of the
footlocker could not be upheld under any of the exceptions to the rule
generally requiring a warrant for a search or seizure, and that it thus
violated the fourth amendment. The search was also determined not to be
a lawful search incident to arrest under the Chimel immediate control
doctrine. The Court pointed out that law enforcement officers had
reduced the footlocker "to their exclusive control," with the result that
there was no longer any danger that the arrestee might gain access to the
footlocker to seize a weapon or destroy evidence. 41 The Court stated that
the footlocker's mobility was not sufficient to justify dispensing with the
"added protections" of a warrant once federal agents had the footlocker
under their exclusive control, because there was not' 'the slightest danger
that the footlocker or its contents could have been removed before a valid
search warrant could be obtained. "42 Furthermore, "once law enforcement officers have reduced luggage or other personal property not
immediately associated with the person of the arrestee to their exclusive
control, and there is no longer any danger that the arrestee might gain
access to the property to seize a weapon or destroy evidence, a search of
that property is no longer an incident of the arrest. "43 The Court did,

other searches," and that the fourth amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches and
seizures "draws no distinctions among 'persons, houses, papers, and effects'." [d. at 8. The Court
determined that when a fourth amendment issue is presented the fundamental inquiry is whether or
not a search or seizure is reasonable under all the circumstances, although it noted that a judicial
warrant serves an important role in assuring that the search or seizure is reasonable. [d. at 9. Chadwick concluded its rejection of the federal government's arguments by stating that' 'a fundamental
purpose of the Fourth Amendment is to safeguard individuals from unreasonable government invasions of legitimate privacy interests, and not simply those interests found inside the four walls of the
home." [d. at 11 (footnote omitted). Cf. United States v. Place, 51 U.S.L.W. 4844 (U.S. June 20,
1983) (police, when they have reasonable suspicion (not amounting to probable cause) that personal
luggage contains narcotics, may briefly detain the luggage without a warrant to quickly confirm or
dispel their suspicion by exposing the luggage to a dog trained to detect the presence of narcotics
(without opening the luggage or inspecting its contents».
41. 433 U.S. at 15. The Court also refused to extend the automobile exception (see infra notes
150-321 and accompanying text) to permit warrantless searches of luggage and other personal property in public places. The automobile exception was held to authorize warrantless searches only of
motor vehicles and other inherently mobile objects, because their inherent mobility "often makes
obtaining a judicial warrant impracticable," because of "the diminished expectation of privacy
which surrounds the automobile," and because of the extensive and detailed regulation of
automobiles and their operation. 433 U.S. at 12-13. People were held to have a "substantially
greater" expectation of privacy in personal luggage than in an automobile. [d. at 13.
42. /d. (footnote omitted).
43. [d. at 15 (footnote omitted). In Chadwick, the Court reiterated (as the Court had in earlier
decisions, see supra note 30) that warrantless searches of luggage or other personal property seized at
the time of arrest cannot be justified as incident to that arrest if the search is remote either in time or
place from the arrest. 433 U.S. at 15.
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however, indicate that personal property over which the police have
gained exclusive control might be subject to a warrantless search in
appropriate circumstances. 44 The Court noted that a warrantless search
might be justified "if officers have reason to believe that luggage contains some immediately dangerous instrumentality such as explosives,
because it would be foolhardy to transport it to the station house without
opening the luggage and disarming the weapon. ,,45
The Court rejected the argument that searches of possessions within
an arrestee's immediate control should be permitted on the grounds that
there is a reduced expectation of privacy caused by the arrest. The Court
reasoned that' 'unlike searches of the person ... searches of possessions
within an arrestee's immediate control cannot be justified by any reduced
expectations of privacy caused by the arrest. Respondents' privacy
interest in the contents of the footlocker was not eliminated simply
because they were under arrest. ,,46
For these reasons, the Court concluded that the warrantless search
of the footlocker was not a legitimate Chimel search incident to arrest.
This followed from the findings that at the time of the warrantless search
of the footlocker, it was in the exclusive control of law enforcement officers, the arrestees were securely in custody, the search was conducted
more than an hour after police gained exclusive control, and there was no
other exigency justifying the warrantless search. 47
The Court's discussion of the particular facts of the case indicates
that the determination of whether exclusive control exists is to be made
on a case by case basis, based on a consideration of all relevant facts. 48 In
New York v. Belton, 49 the Supreme Court noted that the mere fact that a
container and its contents have been seized by a police officer does not

44. [d. See Dawson v. State, 40 Md. App. 640, 395 A.2d 160 (1978), analyzed infra note 50.
45. 433 U.S. at 15 n.9. See infra note 205 and accompanying text.
46. [d. at 16 n.lO.
47. [d. at 15. Although not explicitly stated by the Court, the warrantless search of the
footlocker also could have been held not to be a lawful search incident to arrest because it was not
contemporaneous in time and place with the arrest, as required by Chimel. See supra note 30.
The respondents did not challenge the warrantless seizure of the footlocker. 433 U.S. at II. If
the warrantless seizure had been challenged, it probably would have been upheld on the grounds that
the footlocker would have disappeared to an unknown location had it not been seized immediately.
See W. LA FAVE, supra note 6, §§ 6.5(b), (c).
48. As discussed infra notes 93-109 and accompanying text, New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454
(1981), has held that Chadwick's exclusive control rule does not prohibit police from searching containers discovered in the interior of the passenger compartment of an automobile searched without a
warrant incident to the lawful arrest of the occupants of the automobile. See infra notes 59-149 and
accompanying text.
49. 453 U.S. at461-62n.5.
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mean that the officer has exclusive control of the container and its contents within the meaning of Chadwick. so
As noted earlier, S I the Court in Chadwick indicated that personal
property' 'immediately associated with the person of the arrestee" can be
searched without a warrant even though the arresting officer has exclusive control of such property. The opinion did not define the types of
personal property that might be within this "immediately associated"
standard, and did not explain why such types of personal property should
be excepted from Chadwick's exclusive control rule. "The Court's
opinion does not explain why a wallet carried in the arrested person's
clothing, but not the footlocker in the present case, is subject to 'reduced
expectations of privacy caused by the arrest.' ... Nor does the Court
explain how such items as purses or briefcases fit into the dichotomy.

50. Justice Brennan, in his dissent in Belton, agreed that exclusive control of an article within
the meaning of Chadwick does not occur simply because a police officer is holding the article in his
hand. He stated that exclusive control means more; it requires that the officer have' 'sufficient control such that there is no significant risk that the arrestee or his confederates 'might gain possession
ofa weapon or destructable evidence'." 454 U.S. at471 n.5 (quoting Chimel v. California, 395 U.S.
at 763). Justice Brennan also argued in Belton that "the issue of exclusive control presents a question
offact to be decided under the circumstances of each case .... " 454 U.S. at471 n.5. See infra notes
95-105 and accompanying text.
Lower courts have agreed that exclusive control of an article is to be determined on a case by
case basis, and that an arresting officer does not gain exclusive control of an article simply because
he has taken the article into his hands. United States v. Mefford, 658 F.2d 588 (8th Cir. 1981). In
Dawson v. State, 40 Md. App. 640, 395 A.2d 160 (1978), a warrantless search of an arrestee's
pocketbook by the arresting officer was upheld as a search incident to a lawful arrest. The search of
the pocketbook occurred after the arrest and after the pocketbook was seized and in the hands of the
arresting officer, who had responded to a report of a shooting at an apartment complex. When the
officer arrived at the complex's parking lot, he observed a man and a woman struggling over a
pocketbook. After the man told the officer that the woman had done the shooting and had a gun in
her pocketbook, the officer grabbed the pocketbook, opened it, and seized a gun that was inside. At
this time, he was only a few feet from the woman and, according to the court, was "still involved in
an uncontrolled and potentially life endangering situation." 40 Md. App. at 653, 395 A.2d at 167.
The court consequently held that the warrantless search of the pocketbook was permissible under
Chimel as a search of the area within an arrestee's control, because at the time of the search the
woman was neither handcuffed nor under any physical restraints, and, being only a few feet from
the officer, was therefore within "the Chimel perimeter of reachability, lungeability, or graspability, i.e., the area from within which she could gain access to the pocketbook and the gun." [d.
(Although the court did not discuss whether the woman had been arrested prior to the search of the
pocketbook, the warrantless search of the pocketbook could permissibly precede the actual arrest.
See supra notes 24, 30). In Dawson the court also noted that Chadwick did not prohibit the warrantless search of the pocketbook, because the pocketbook was "immediately associated with the
person of the arrestee" at the time of the search, and was thus "analytically akin to a search of an
item found in an arrestee's clothing or pockets," and, alternatively, because "the uncontrolled and
potentially life endangering situation" constituted "exigent circumstances" within the meaning of
Chadwick. 40 Md. App. at 653,395 A.2d at 167. See supra notes 4345 and accompanying text.
51. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
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Perhaps the holding. . will be limited in the future to objects that are
relatively immobile by virtue of their size or absence of a means of propulsion. "52 If the opening and inspection of the contents of a container
or other item of personal property constitutes a fourth amendment
search because it violates a person's actual and legitimate expectation of
privacy, 5 3 if the police have exclusive control of the container and its contents when they open and inspect the contents of the container, and if
there are no exigent circumstances, the fourth amendment should prohibit the warrantless opening and inspection of the contents of the
container, regardless of whether the container is immediately associated
with the person. In Chadwick, the Court offers no reasoning relating its
immediately associated with the person distinction to the fourth amendment's reasonableness requirement. 54

52. United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 20-21 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). As discussed
earlier, see supra note 24, the Supreme Court in United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973), and
in Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260 (1973), appeared to permit police, without a warrant, to open
and inspect any items found on the person of an arrestee being searched incident to a lawful arrest.
New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. at 461, stated in dictum that Robinson allows police to search containers located during the search of an arrestee's person even though the container searched could
hold neither a weapon nor evidence of the criminal conduct for which the suspect was arrested. The
Court in Bel/on, although citing with approval the holding in Robinson that the warrantless search
of a crumpled-up cigarette package found on an arrestee's person was permissible as a search incident to a lawful arrest, did not reach the question of whether Chadwick's "exclusive control" and
"immediately associated with the person" standards had modified the permissible scope of the
search of the person of an arrestee under Robinson. See supra note 24.
One lower court has asserted that Chadwick only limits the search of items that are within
an arrestee's immediate control, such as luggage, but does not prohibit the police from searching
an arrestee's clothes, as occurred in United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800 (1974), or items found
in an arrestee's pocket, as occurred in Robinson. United States v. Berry, 560 F.2d 861, 864 (7th Cir.
1977). In Berry the Court held that an attache case carried by an arrestee at the time he was arrested
was not immediately associated with the arrestee's person and was subject to Chadwick's exclusive
control rule.
Lower courts have held that a woman's pocketbook is immediately associated with an arrestee's
person, Dawson v. State, 40 Md. App. 640, 395 A.2d 160 (1978), (see supra note 50), but that a briefcase, Shingleton v. State, 39 Md. App. 527, 387 A.2d 1134 (1978), attache case, United States v.
Berry, 560 F.2d 861 (7th Cir. 1977), suitcase, United States v. Ester, 442 F. Supp. 736 (S.D.N.Y.
1977), State v. Dudley, 561 S.W.2d 403 (Mo. App. 1978), and overnight case, State v. Dean, 574
P.2d 572 (Kan. 1978), are not immediately associated with an arrestee's person.
53. See supra note 6.
54. The "immediately associated with the person" distinction is also inconsistent with the
determination in Chadwick that there is no distinction under the fourth amendment's warrant clause
between searches of one's person, home, office, private communications, and personal property.
433 U.S. at 6-7.
Without citing or analyzing Chadwick, the Supreme Court stated in dictum in United States v.
Ross, 456 U.S. at 798, that "a container carried at the time of arrest often may be searched without a
warrant and even without any specific suspicion concerning its contents."
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The Chadwick Court also did not describe the types of containers
and other items of personal property, other than personal luggage, that
are not immediately associated with an arrestee's person, and thus subject to its exclusive control and exigent circumstances standards. The
Court, however, subsequently addressed, in automobile exception search
cases, H the issue of the application of Chadwick to the warrantless opening and inspection of the contents of closed, opaque containers. 56
The Chadwick decision thus limits the right of police to open
without a warrant and inspect luggage and certain other types of containers and personal property discovered in the area within an arrestee's
immediate control during a Chimel search incident to lawful arrest.
Although Chimel may authorize a warrantless search of the area adjacent
to a lawfully arrested individual, the right of the police to open and
inspect the contents of luggage and certain other containers found within

55. Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979); Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420 (1981);
United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982). See supra note 39 and infra notes 193-321 and accompanying text.
56. As discussed subsequently, see infra notes 295-321 and accompanying text, the validity of a
warrantless opening of a container and inspection of its contents by police should be determined by
deciding first whether the police conduct constituted a search by violating an individual's actual and
reasonable expectations of privacy, see supra note 6, and then, if the answer is affirmative, determining whether, under Chadwick, the police had exclusive control of the container and its contents;
and finally, if the police had exclusive control, whether there were exigent circumstances. This
approach should be followed regardless of whether the police attempt to justify a warrantless search
of a container under the Chimel search incident to a lawful arrest exception or under the automobile
exception, because the determination of whether warrantless police conduct is a fourth amendment
search or seizure is separate and distinct from the determination of whether the warrantless police
conduct was reasonable under the fourth amendment, see supra note 6, and because Chadwick indicates that the standards governing a warrantless search of luggage or personal property should be
separate and distinct from the standards governing when luggage or personal property can be seized
without a warrant and when an automobile can be searched without a warrant under Chimel or the
automobile exception. In Chadwick, the Court gave no indication that the standard governing warrantless searches of luggage and other containers is dependent upon the justification for the warrantless seizure of the luggage or other container; in fact, the validity of the warrantless seizure of the
footlocker was not challenged in Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 13. The Court in Chadwick also indicated
that it was establishing general principles governing the search of luggage and other personal property, which did not depend upon the justification for the search of an automobile or other premises
where the luggage or other personal property was discovered, by stating that "in our view, when no
exigency is shown to support the need for an immediate search, the Warrant Clause places the line at
the point where the property to be searched comes under the exclusive dominion of police
authority." 433 U.S. at 15. United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982), modified this holding, by
adopting a rule permitting police to open without a warrant and inspect the contents of any
container in an automobile when they have probable cause to believe that seizable items are
located somewhere in the automobile but not in any particular container therein, and when the automobile is being lawfully searched under the automobile exception. See infra notes 250-321 and
accompanying text.
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this area is limited by Chadwick's exclusive control, exigent circumstances, and immediately associated with the person standards.
The Chadwick decision did not, however, limit the right of police,
under the plain view seizure doctrine, to seize items having a nexus with
criminal activity that are observed or discovered in plain view and within
the Chimel immediate control area. 57 In Chadwick, the Court held that
the federal agents had no right to open the footlocker without a warrant;
however, it seems reasonable to conclude that if the contents of the
footlocker-marijuana-had been observed in plain view at the time of
arrest, the marijuana would have been subject to seizure without a war-

57. A warrantless seizure of an item discovered or observed during a lawful search of an
arrestee's area of immediate control under Chimel is permitted if the requirements of the plain view
seizure doctrine are met. See Texas v. Brown, 103 S. Ct. 1525 (1983); Coolidge v. New Hampshire,
403 U.S. 443, 465 n.24 (1971) (plurality opinion). (Although three requirements of the plain view
seizure doctrine were defined by only a plurality of the Supreme Court in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, lower federal courts and state courts have almost universally followed the Coolidge interpretation of that doctrine. See W. LA FAVE, supra note 6, § 4.11.) The first requirement is that the
government agent making the seizure must have lawfully entered the premises where the seizure was
made, whether pursuant to a warrant or under one of the exceptions to the warrant requirement,
Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 465-66 (plurality opinion), Brown, 103 S. Ct. at 1540-41, 1545, and, at the
same time the agent must discover or observe the item seized while he is in a place he has a right to be.
Washington v. Chrisman, 455 U.S. 1,5-6 (1982). This would require, in a warrantless search under
Chimel, that the police be lawfully on the premises where the arrest was made and that the item
seized be discovered or observed while the officer is within the area of the arrestee's immediate control. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. at 465 n. 24. The second requirement is that it must be
immediately apparent to an officer when he first observes or discovers the item seized that there is
probable cause to believe that the item is evidence, contraband, or an instrumentality of crime, id. at
466 (plurality opinion); Illinois v. Andreas, 51 U.S.L.W. 5157, 5159 (U.S. June 28,1983); Brown,
103 S. Ct. at 1542 (plurality opinion), or is another object seizable under the fourth amendment, see
Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967), without any further testing or investigation of the item to
determine if the item has a nexus with criminal activity. See C. WHITEBREAD, supra note 6, § 11.04.
Finally, the discovery of the item must be inadvertent and not anticipated, Coolidge, 403 U.S. at
469. (That is, the government agents must not have probable cause to believe the item seized would
be on the premises searched, sufficient to have obtained a search warrant authorizing seizure of the
item. See C. WHITEBREAD, supra note 6, § 11.03.) The four dissenters in Coolidge, however, refused
to accept the plurality's inadvertent discovery requirement under the plain view seizure doctrine, 403
U.S. at 505 (Black, J., concurring and dissenting), 403 U.S. at 514 (White, J., concurring and dissenting). See also Texas v. Brown, 103 S. Ct. 1535, 1543-44 (1983). The majority of lower federal and
state courts, however, have accepted this requirement "as the law of the land." W. LA FAVE, supra
note 6, § 4.11 (d). The warrantless seizure of contraband, stolen, or dangerous objects may be permissible under the plain view seizure doctrine even when the police know in advance that they will
find the objects in plain view on the premises and intend to seize them. Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 471. In
addition, when exigent circumstances were present, a seizure may be upheld under the plain view
seizure doctrine even though the discovery of the items seized was not inadvertent. [d. at 471.
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rant, whether or not the footlocker was within the area of the arrestee's
immediate control. S8

II.

WARRANTLESS SEARCH OF AN AUTOMOBILE INCIDENT TO A
LAWFUL ARREST: NEW YORK v. BELTON

In New York v. Beiton, S9 the Supreme Court held for the first time
that a warrantless search of an automobile could be permissible as a
search incident to a lawful arrest under Chimel v. California. In Belton, a
state policeman stopped a speeding automobile and requested the
driver's license and the automobile's registration. 60 The policeman
discovered that none of the four men in the automobile owned it or was
related to its owner. While making these determinations, the officer
smelled burnt marijuana and saw on the floor of the automobile an
envelope marked "Supergold," a term the officer associated with marijuana. He then ordered the occupants out of the automobile and placed
all of them under arrest for unlawful possession of marijuana. After
patting down each of the occupants, the arresting officer stood each
occupant next to the sides of the automobile 61 in positions such that
mutual physical contact was impossible. The officer then seized the
"Supergold" envelope, in which he found marijuana. He also searched
the passenger compartment ofthe automobile and found ajacket belonging to Belton on the back seat. In a zipped pocket of the jacket, the officer
found a quantity of cocaine. Belton's motion to suppress the cocaine as
evidence was denied by the trial court, and he was convicted of a controlled substance offense involving possession of the cocaine.
The Court in Belton held that the warrantless search of Belton's
jacket was lawful62 and that it did not violate the fourth and fourteenth
amendments to the Constitution. 63 Although the passenger compartment of the automobile might have been held to be within the immediate

58. In Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 764 n. 13 (1979), discussed infra notes 195-212 and
accompanying text, the Court indicates that Chadwick does not require a warrant when the contents
of a container are open to plain view.
59. 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
60. The warrantless stop of the automobile and the request by the state policeman to see the
operator's license and the automobile's registration were not challenged in Belton; however, these
warrantless actions would have been upheld. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979).
61. See 453 U.S. at 456.
62. Belton did not challenge the lawfulness of his arrest. 453 U.S. at 460 n.2.
63. Because of this holding, the Court did not address the question of whether the search of
Belton's jacket and the seizure of the cocaine in the jacket were permissible under the automobile
exception. 453 U.S. at 462 n. 6.
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control of the four arrestees at the time the arresting officer searched
Belton's jacket, 64 Justice Stewart, writing for a 5-4 majority, 65 adopted a
per se rule that now defines the permissible scope of the search of an
automobile and its contents when the occupants of an automobile have
been lawfully arrested.
The Court determined in Belton that whenever a police officer has
made a lawful custodial arrest of the occupant of an automobile he may,

64. At the time of the search of the back seat of the passenger compartment of the automobile,
the occupants of the automobile were apparently standing by the side of the automobile, see 453
u.s. at 456, so that the rear passenger seat of the automobile arguably was within the lunge or grasp
of one or more of the arrested occupants at the time of the search of Belton's jacket. This argument
would be stronger if the facts in Belton had indicated that a passenger door (especially a rear
passenger door) of the automobile hr.d been open at the time of the search of Belton's jacket or if the
window of a passenger door (especially a rear passenger door) had been rolled down at the time of
the search of the jacket. If any such facts had been present in Belton, it would have been easier for
one of the four arrestees (or Belton) to have lunged or reached into the rear passenger compartment
of the automobile and to have hidden, scattered or removed the cocaine in the jacket. Two other
facts support an argument that the automobile's rear passenger compartment was within the immediate control of Belton or one of the other three arrestees at the time of the search of the jacket. The
first is that none of the four arrestees apparently were handcuffed or otherwise physically restrained
at the time of the search of the jacket (see supra note 34 and accompanying text). The second is that
there were four arrestees and only one arresting officer (see supra note 33 and accompanying text).
Although the majority in Belton declined to decide the case simply by applying the Chimel principles, see supra notes 18-35 and accompanying text, Justice Stewart stated for the majority in
Belton that "our reading of the cases suggests the generalization that articles inside the relatively
narrow compass of the passenger compartment of an automobile are in fact generally, even if not
inevitably, within 'the area into which an arrestee might reach in order to grab a weapon or evidentiary item.' Chimel, 395 U.S. at 763." 453 U.S. at 460.
Justice Brennan, however, argued in dissent that under the specific facts of the case, Belton's
jacket was not within the area of immediate control of the four arrestees and therefore could not be
searched without a warrant under Chimel. 453 U.S. at 466-67. Although Justice Brennan did not
provide reasoning to support this conclusion, it might have been argued that when the officer seized
the cocaine Belton's jacket had already been picked up and was within the officer's exclusive control
within the meaning of Chadwick, and, for that reason, the zipped pocket could not have been
searched without a warrant. See supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text. For this argument to succeed, however, the jacket would have to be found not to be an item immediately associated with the
person, see supra notes 51-54 and accompanying text, and to be the type of personal property to
which Chadwick's exclusive control rule applies. See supra notes 55-56 and infra notes 284-94 and
accompanying text. Furthermore, there would also have to be a finding that there was no exigency at
the time Belton's jacket was searched in order for Chadwick's exclusive control rule to be applicable.
See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text; Dawson v. State, 40 Md. App. 640, 395 A.2d 160
(1978), discussed supra note 50.
65. Justice Rehnquist concurred in Justice Stewart's opinion, providing the fifth vote that
made Justice Stewart's opinion the opinion of the Court. Justice Rehnquist stated, however, that he
would like to have based the judgment of the Court upon an overruling of Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S.
643 (1961) (which made the exclusionary rule, see supra note 6, applicable to the states), but no other
Justice expressed agreement with that view. Justice Stevens concurred in the Court's judgment, but
on grounds different from those stated in Justice Stewart's opinion. Justice Stevens' rationale is
expressed in his dissenting opinion in Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 444 (1981). Justices Brennan, Marshall, and White dissented.
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without a search warrant, conduct a Chime! search of the interior of the
passenger compartment of the automobile (but not the trunk) and
examine the contents of any containers found within the passenger compartment. The Court defined "container" as any "object capable of
holding another object," and included in the definition "closed or open
glove compartments, consoles, or other receptacles located anywhere
within the passenger compartment, as well as luggage, boxes, bags,
clothing, and the like. "66 The containers found to be subject to search
under Belton may be closed or open. 67 Justice Stewart, however, did not
differentiate between locked and unlocked containers 68 or between
opaque and transparent containers. 69 Furthermore, it appears that a
container does not have to be one that could contain a weapon or
evidence in order to be subject to a warrantless search; 70 one such container, a crumpled-up cigarette package,71 was searched in United
States v. Robinson. 72
Although the Court adopted a per se rule defining the permissible
scope of the search of an automobile incident to a lawful arrest under
Chime!, Justice Stewart stated in Belton that this rule in "no way alters
the fundamental principles established in the Chime! case regarding the
basic scope of searches incident to lawful custodial arrests. "73 This statement implicitly permits, as does Chime!, a search of the passenger compartment of an automobile and any containers therein after its occupants
are lawfully arrested, regardless of how trivial or minor the offense,74
regardless of the fact that the offense for which the automobile's occupants were arrested is not an offense for which evidence could exist, 7sand

66. 453 U.S. at 460 n. 4. See Virgin Islands v. Rasool, 657 F.2d 582 (3d Cir. 1981)("container"
within the meaning of Belton includes a brown paper grocery bag).
67. 453 U.S. at 461.
68. Justice Brennan stated in dissent that "presumably" the majority would have reached the
same result even if the four arrestees had been handcuffed and placed in the patrol car and if the
search "had extended to locked luggage or other inaccessible containers locked in the back seat of
the car." [d. at 468.
69. See infra notes 228-30 and accompanying text.
70. 453 U.S. at 461.
71. [d.
72. 414 U.S. 218 (1973). Robinson is analyzed supra note 24.
73. 453 U.S. at 460 n. 3. Justice Stewart also stated that "our holding today does no more than
determine the meaning of Chimel's principles in this particular and problematic context." [d.
Michigan v. Long, 51 U.S.L.W. 5231, 5232 n. I (U.S. June 28,1983), raised but did not decide the
question of whether a search of an automobile can be made under Belton when the police have probable cause to arrest an occupant but do not actually effect the arrest.
74. See supra note 28.
75. Cj. supra note 24.
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regardless ofthe lack of probable cause or reasonable suspicion that there
are weapons or evidence in the automobile's passenger compartment. 76
Belton's per se rule departs from prior decisions interpreting the permissible scope of a search of the area within the immediate control of an
arrestee. Previously the Court held that even though the police could
search the area within the immediate control of an arrestee in every case
where the arrest was lawful, 77 the scope of that area was to be determined
on a case by case basis, taking into account all relevant factors.78 Justice
Stewart noted in Belton 79 that the per se rule being adopted was
analogous to the one previously adopted in United States v. Robinson, 80
that allowed a full-scale search of an arrestee's person on all occasions
when that individual has been lawfully placed under custodial arrest. 81
He stated that one reason for adopting this rule was the difficulties
encountered by the courts in defining on a case by case basis, following
Chime/, the permissible scope of a warrantless search of the interior of
an automobile's passenger compartment incident to the lawful arrest
of its occupants. 82 An additional reason was the desirability of notifying the public of how courts will define their constitutional protection
in applying "a settled principle to a recurring factual situation" and of
notifying police of the scope of their authority in "the recurring factual
situation" of searches of automobiles after their occupants have been
lawfully arrested. 83
In United States v. Robinson,84 however, the Court adduced different reasons. These included the need to protect an arresting officer
from possible danger if an arrested individual possesses a dangerous
weapon,8' and the fact that the decision by an arresting officer to search
the person of an arrestee is "necessarily a quick ad hoc judgment" that
should not be subject to later judicial review. 86 In Belton, the Court did
76. See supra note 28. In order for the police to make a warrantless search of an automobile
under the automobile exception, however, the police must have probable cause to believe that the
automobile contains seizable items such as weapons, contraband, or evidence of crime, see infra
note 151 and accompanying text, although arrest of the occupants of an automobile is not a prerequisite for a warrantless search of the automobile under the automobile exception. See infra note
177 and accompanying text.
77. See supra note 28.
78. See supra notes 31-35 and accompanying text.
79. 453 U.S. at 459.
80. 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
81. See supra note 24.
82. 453 U.S. at 459, 460.
83. [d. at 460.
84. 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
85. [d. at 234-35.
86. [d. at 235.
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not refer to this argument in justifying its adoption of aper se rule and, in
Robinson, the Court did not support its per se rule by referring to the
arguments stated in Belton. Because the rule adopted in both Robinson
and Chimel have the purpose of preventing lawfully arrested individuals
from destroying or concealing evidence or from obtaining a weapon, it
would seem that the reasons supporting the Belton rule should be the
same as those provided in Robinson.
Justice Stewart in Belton also justified the warrantless search of containers found within an automobile's passenger compartment on the
grounds that if the passenger compartment is within the reach of an
arrested occupant of the automobile, other containers inside the
passenger compartment will also be within his reach. 87 He concluded that
the "justification for the search is not that the arrestee has no privacy
interest in the container, but that the lawful custodial arrest justifies the
infringement of any privacy interest the arrestee may have. "88
In dissent, Justice Brennan argued that an exception to the general
requirement for a warrant should be based upon a careful consideration
"of the facts and circumstances of each search and seizure, focusing on
the reasons supporting the exception rather than on any bright line rule of
general application. ,,89 He also argued that Chimel requires a case by
case delineation of the area within an arrestee's immediate control. The
court should determine not "whether the arrestee could ever have
reached the area that was searched but whether he could have reached it
at the time of arrest and search."90 Justice Brennan argued that the
court's per se rule was inconsistent with the rationale underlying Chimel
because it "grants police officers authority to conduct a warrantless

87. 453 U.S. at 460.
88. [d. at 461. Justice Stewart in Be/ton drew an analogy to Chime/'s holding, 395 U.S. at 763,
noting that police can search drawers within an arrestee's reach, but not all drawers in the arrestee's
house. 453 U.S. at 461. The opinion in United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973), and Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260 (1973), did not differentiate between the search of the person and the
search of containers found on the person in defining the permissible scope of a search on one's person incident to arrest. See supra note 24.
89. 453 U.S. at 464. Justice Brennan also approvingly quoted, id. at 464 n. 1, the following
statements made in Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 357 (1931): "There is no
formula for the determination of reasonableness. Each case is to be decided on its own facts and circumstances." Justice Brennan also referred, 453 U.S. at 469 n. 4, to the following statement in
Chime/: "[The Court) cannot ... excuse the absence of a search warrant without a showing by those
who seek exemption from the constitutional mandate that the exigencies of the situation made that
course imperative." 395 U.S. at 761 (citing McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 456 (1948».
90. 453 U.S. at 469. Justice Brennan also cited, 453 U.S. at 468, Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S.
291,295 (1973), for the proposition "that the scope of a warrantless search must be commensurate
with the rationale that excepts the search from the warrant requirement."
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'area' search under circumstances where there is no chance that the
arrestee 'might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence.' , '91
Even if the Court in Belton was correct in adopting a per se rule
defining the permissible scope of a warrantless search of an automobile
under Chimef9 2 rather than requiring the permissible scope of searches to
be decided on a case by case basis, the majority opinion in Belton, as
noted by Justice Brennan in dissent,93 is difficult to reconcile with United
States v. Chadwick. 94 In addition, the rule will be difficult to apply to the
varying factual situations confronting police when they arrest an occupant of an automobile.
The Court in Belton held that the seizure of the cocaine in Belton's
jacket was not prohibited by Chadwick, because that case did not involve
"an arguably valid search incident to a lawful custodial arrest. ,,95 The
Court distinguished Chadwick, wherein the Court noted that the
challenged search of a footlocker had occurred "more than an hour after
federal agents had gained exclusive control of the footlocker and long
after respondents were securely in custody. "96 Thus, that search could
"not be viewed as incidental to the arrest or as justified by any other
exigency. "97 Moreover, the Court argued, the police did not gain exclusive control of Belton's jacket and the cocaine in a jacket pocket within
the meaning of Chadwick simply because a police officer searched
Belton's jacket and seized its contents. 98 Justice Stewart, however, did
not explain why Belton's jacket and the cocaine in a jacket pocket were
not within the exclusive control of the arresting officer within the meaning of Chadwick once the officer had taken possession of it;99 did

91. 453 U.S. at 468 (citing Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. at 763).
Prior to the Belton decision, Professor Wayne La Fave argued that the relevant facts in determining what areas of an automobile can be searched without a warrant under Chimel should be those
"which show (i) what places it would be possible for the arrestee presently to reach, and (ii) perhaps
of somewhat lesser importance, how probable it is that the arrestee would undertake to seek means
of resistance or escape or to destroy evidence." W. LA FAVE, supra note 6, § 7.1 at p. 502.
92. This article will not analyze in depth the pros and cons of per se exceptions to the general
rule requiring a warrant for search and seizures. See generally, La Fave, "Case-by-Case Adjudication" versus "Standardized Procedures"; The Robinson Dilemma, 1974 SUP. CT. REV. 127.
93. 453 U.S. at 469.
94. 433 U.S. I (1977). See supra notes 36-58 and accompanying text.
95. 453 U.S. at 462.
96. [d.
97. United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. at IS (quoted in New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. at 462).
Justice Stewart also quoted, id., a statement in Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 764n. II (1979),
discussed infra notes 195-212 and accompanying text, where the Court had stated that the warrantless search of a suitcase was not argued to have been a lawful search incident to a lawful arrest.
98. 453 U.S. at 461 n. 5.
99. Cj. supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text.
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not explain why containers found within the interior of the passenger
compartment of an automobile after its occupants have been arrested are
always subject to a warrantless search; and did not explain why
containers are never within the exclusive control of the arresting officer
within the meaning of Chadwick 100 and why a per se exception to
Chadwick's exclusive control rule is necessary in Belton situations.
He gave no reasons for adopting this exception to Chadwick's exclusive
control standard.
Justice Brennan agreed with Justice Stewart that a police officer
does not gain exclusive control of an item within the meaning of Chadwick "simply by holding it in his hand,"lol and stated in his dissent that
"exclusive control" under Chadwick "means more than that. It means
sufficient control such that there is no significant risk that the arrestee or
his confederates 'might gain possession of a weapon or destructible
evidence.' ... The issue of exclusive control presents a question of fact
to be decided under the circumstances of each case .... " 102
Justice Brennan is correct in interpreting Chadwick as requiring a
case by case determination of whether an item is in the exclusive control
of a police officer. 103 Justice Stewart in Belton supported his analysis of
Chadwick by quoting a passage from Chadwick that discusses exclusive
control within the context of Chadwick's particular facts. 104 Applying
this argument to the facts of Belton, Justice Stewart implicitly, without
any supporting analysis, created a per se exception to Chadwick's exclusive control standard with respect to containers 1 O~ discovered when police
search the interior of an automobile's passenger compartment after
lawfully arresting its occupants. Justice Stewart found this new rule to be
consistent with Chadwick. In so doing, he failed to distinguish between
two issues. The first involves the identification of areas adjacent to an
arrestee that may be searched without a warrant (an issue governed by
Chime/'s immediate control standard). The second involves the criteria
to be used to determine when a container or other item of personal property found within a searchable area, i.e., that area adjacent to and within

100. Cj. supra note 48 and accompanying text.
101. 453 U.S. at 471 n. 5.
102. Id. (citation omitted) (quoting from Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. at 763).
103. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
104. This passage from Chadwick. quoted in Belton at 453 U.S. at 462, reads as follows: "Here
the search was conducted more than an hour after federal agents had gained exclusive control of the
footlocker and long after respondents were securely in custody; the search therefore cannot be
viewed as incidental to the arrest or justified by any other exigency." United States v. Chadwick, 433
U.S. at 15.
105. See supra notes 66-72 and accompanying text.
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the immediate control of an arrestee, is within an officer's exclusive control within the meaning of Chadwick.
In justifying its per se rule, the majority in Belton referred to the
difficulty courts had encountered in determining when passenger compartments of automobiles were within an arrestee's immediate control
within the meaning of Chimel, 106 but did not suggest that the courts had
encountered any difficulty defining when police can search and inspect
the contents of containers found within the passenger compartment of
the automobile. This exception to Chadwick's "exclusive control" standard, however, is consistent with the other reason given by the Belton
majority for adopting its per se rule: giving notice to the public of
the scope of their constitutional rights and to the police of the scope of
their authority. 107
Justice Powell, who joined Justice Stewart's opinion for the Court
in Belton, noted in his concurring opinion in Robbins v. California that
the Belton rule is justified by the fact that "immediately preceding the
arrest, the passengers have complete control over the entire interior of the
automobile, and can place weapons or contraband into pockets or other
containers as the officer approaches. Thus, practically speaking, it is difficult to justify varying degrees of protection for the general interior of
the car and for the various containers found within. These considerations
do not apply to the trunk of the car, which is not within the control of the
passengers either immediately before or during the process of arrest. ,'108
Justice Powell, however, did not discuss how this reasoning could be
reconciled with the Court's determination in Chadwick that police cannot open and inspect the contents of a piece of luggage within their exclusive control even when they have probable cause to believe that the piece
of luggage contains seizable items. 109
The majority in Belton failed to explain why they would authorize
police to search without a warrant all containers found within the
passenger compartment of an automobile when that search is incident to
the lawful arrest of its occupants, rather than requiring them to lock the
articles in the trunk of the automobile or in the officer's police car and
then to obtain a warrant to search containers. Such a procedure would
promote the goals of preventing arrestees from obtaining weapons or
concealing, removing, or destroying evidence, the goals underlying the

106. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
107. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.

108. 453 U.S. at 431 (Powell, J., concurring).
109. See id. at 429-36 (Powell, J., concurring).
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Chimel immediate control rule I 10 as well as the rule actually adopted by
the Belton majority. This is so because the opportunity provided to an
arrestee to lunge or grasp for a weapon or evidence in an automobile is
not significantly different when the arresting officer takes time to lock
containers in the trunk of an automobile than when that officer opens
and inspects the contents of the containers. An arresting officer concerned that the arrested occupants might lunge or grasp for weapons or
evidence in the automobile while he was locking containers in its trunk
could be authorized to seize the automobile's keys and to lock the doors
and trunk, without removing any containers from the automobile. He
might then lock the arrested occupants inside his police vehicle or have
the automobile towed from the scene of the arrest to a police impoundment or storage lot. III Such alternative rules would be consistent with
another of the reasons given by the majority in Belton for adopting its per
se rule, 112 because they would define the rights of members of the public
and the scope of the authority of the police just as clearly as does the
Belton rule. 113
Justice Stevens criticized Belton in his dissent in Robbins v. California. 114 He argued that Belton would encourage police to arrest the
operator of the automobile, and take him into custody even when they
have the discretion simply to issue a summons or citation, II S only for the

110. See also supra notes 36-58 and accompanying text.
If Chadwick's exclusive control standard is to be applied on a case by case basis to searches of
containers discovered within the passenger compartment of an automobile searched incident to the
lawful arrest of the automobile's occupants, courts first should determine whether particular containers and other items of personal property are the types of personal property to which Chadwick's
exclusive control rule is applicable. See supra notes 51-56 and infra notes 291-321 and accompanying
text. Although some types of containers, such as suitcases and briefcases, to which Belton's per se
rule applies should be subject to Chadwick's exclusive control rule, other types of containers subject
to Belton's per se rule, such as paper bags and plastic trash bags, in certain cases should not be subject to Chadwick's exclusive control rule. See supra notes 51-56 and infra notes 291-321 and accompanying text.
Ill. See supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text.
112. See W. LA FAVE, supra note 6, § 7.1(b) at 505-06. If police followed these alternatives,
there would be the danger that un apprehended accomplices or members of the public might break
into the automobile and remove evidence from the automobile or take the automobile (and any
evidence therein); however, the automobile exception, see infra notes 150-61 and accompanying
text, but not the Chimel doctrine, see supra notes 21-30 and accompanying text, is intended to permit
police to act without a warrant to guard against such possibilities.
113. See 453 U.S. at 460. See also supra note 83 and accompanying text.
114. 453 U.S. at 450 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
115. Some states give police officers discretion as to whether to arrest an operator of an
automobile for a traffic offense or to allow the person to remain free from custody after giving him a
summons or citation. E.g., IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 321.482, 485 (West 1981-82): KAN. STAT. ANN. §
8-2105 (1975); MD. TRANSP. CODE ANN. §§ 26-201-205 (1977).
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purpose of searching the entire interior of the passenger compartment
and the containers therein pursuant to Belton's per se rule .. Justice
Stevens suggested that a police officer with such discretion might act in
this manner "whenever he sees an interesting looking briefcase or
package in a vehicle that has been stopped for a traffic violation." 116
Some state courts and lower federal courts would hold a warrantless
search incident to an arrest to be unlawful when the arresting officer is
shown to have arrested the defendant solely for the purpose of conducting awarrantless search incident to a lawful arrest. These courts would
say that such a purpose made the search unreasonable and invalid under
the fourth amendment. 117 Although the Supreme Court has not explicitly
addressed this issue, in Scott v. United States, 118 the Court stated in
dictum that fourth amendment violations are to be determined' 'under a
standard of reasonableness without regard to the underlying intent or
motivation of the officers involved." 119
As noted by Justice Brennan in his dissenting opinion in Belton, 120
its per se rule will be difficult to apply to the myriad of factual situations
in which police lawfully arrest a person while he is driving or riding in an
automobile; furthermore, Belton "offers no guidance to the police
officer seeking to work out these answers for himself.,,121
The majority in Belton stated that their decision' 'does no more than
determine the meaning of Chimel's principles in this particular and problematic context" and that "it in no way alters the fundamental principles
established in the Chimel case regarding the basic scope of searches inci-

116. 453 U.S. at 452 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens also noted that
persons apprehended for traffic violations are frequently not required to accompany the
arresting officer to the police station before they are permitted to leave on their own
recognizance or by using their dtiver's licenses as a form of bond. It is also possible that
state law or local regulations may in some cases forbid police officers from taking persons
into custody for violation of minor traffic laws. As a matter of constitutional law,
however, any person lawfully arrested for the pettiest misdemeanor may be temporarily
placed in custody.
[d. at 450 (footnote omitted). As noted also by Justice Stevens in dissent in Robbins, an automobile
driver's protection against warrantless searches of his automobile under Belton may depend upon
whether state or local law authorizes police to arrest a person for a minor traffic violation. See supra
note 115.
117. E.g., Amador-Gonzalez v. United States, 391 'F.2d 308 (5th Cir. 1968); Taglavor v.
United States, 291 F.2d 262 (9th Cir. 1961); Blazak v. Eyman, 339 F. Supp. 40 (D. Ariz. 1971); Diggs
v. State, 345 So.2d 815 (Fla. App. 1977); State v. Cotterman, 544 S.W.2d 322 (Mo. App. 1976). Cj.
People v. Watkins, 19 m.2d II, 166 N.E.2d 433 (1960). See generally, W. LA FAVE, supra note 6, §§
5.2(e),7.5.
118. 436 U.S. 128 (1978).
119. [d. at 138 (footnote omitted).
120. 453 U.S. at 469 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
121. [d. at 470 (Brennan, J.,dissenting).
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dent to lawful custodial arrests." 1H Justice Brennan disagreed. He noted
in dissent that, although the majority "concludes that a warrantless
search of a car may take place even though the suspect was arrested outside the car, it does not indicate how long after the suspect's arrest that
search may validly be conducted. Would a warrantless search incident to
arrest be valid if conducted five minutes after the suspect left his car?
Thirty minutes? Three hours?"123
In Belton, the majority stated that the search of an automobile's
passenger compartment must be a "contemporaneous incident of that
arrest, "124 but they did not address the issue raised by Justice Brennan
because the arresting officer searched the automobile's passenger compartment immediately after placing the occupants under arrest. 12S The
Court had indicated in Chadwick 126 that a search of a container that took
place an hour after arrest was not a contemporaneous search and could
not be upheld under Chimel. The decision in Belton, however, does not
indicate how long a delay, short of an hour, is permissible between arrest
of an automobile's occupants and the search of an automobile's
passenger compartment. The permissible length of delay may depend
upon the reasons for it. 127 A long delay might be permitted, for example,
when the arresting officer must custodially arrest, physically restrain,
and search the person of a number of individuals, or when the officer
must wait for police dispatchers to determine whether an automobile is
stolen or whether any of the arrestees had criminal records or were
wanted as fugitives.
Although the majority in Belton said that its per se rule does not alter
the fundamental principles of Chimel v. California,128 it did not say
whether the applicability of its per se rule is dependent upon the physical
proximity to the automobile of an arrested occupant of the automobile at
the time of the search of the automobile's passenger compartment. 129
122. 453 u.s. at 460 n. 3. See supra notes 73-76 and accompanying text.
123. 453 U.S. at 470 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Cf United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800
(1974), discussed supra note 24.
124. 453 U.S. at 460.
125. [d. at 456. The Court noted that the search of Belton's jacket "followed immediately
upon that arrest." [d. at 462.
126. See supra note 47 and accompanying text. See also United States v. Monclavo:Cruz, 662
F.2d 1285 (9th Cir. 1981) (warrantless search of purse at police station more than an hour after
police had seized it from an automobile and when police had exclusive control of it not permissible
under Belton and Chadwick).
127. Cf Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692 (1981 )(permissible length of investigative stop of
suspect for Questioning depends upon nature of crime being investigated and types of Questions that
are necessary in a particular situation to make a reasonable investigation) (dictum).
128. See supra notes 73-76 and accompanying text.
129. Justice Brennan raised this issue in his dissent in Belton. 453 U.S. at 470.
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The opmlOn also failed to indicate whether the per se rule applies
regardless of the amount of physical restraint to which the arrested occupants are subjected when the automobile's passenger compartment is
searched. Justice Stewart did not address these two issues in Belton,
apparently because none of the arrested occupants of the automobile was
handcuffed or otherwise physically restrained when police searched the
passenger compartment. Furthermore, all of the arrestees were standing
next to the automobile. 130 The majority in Belton did make it clear, by
distinguishing Chadwick l31 from Belton on the grounds that in Chadwick the search took place after the arrestees were securely in custody, 132
that a warrantless search of an automobile would not be permitted if the
arrestees had been jailed. But Belton did not address whether a warrantless search of the passenger compartment of an automobile is permitted
when the arrested occupant of the automobile has been handcuffed and
locked in the back seat of a police car (which has a metal screen between
the front and back seats) or handcuffed to a police officer. 133 In such
situations, the passenger compartment of an automobile would not seem
to be within the lunge, grasp, or immediate control of an arrested occupant and therefore should not, under Chimel, be subject to a search
without a warrant. Nevertheless, Belton's per se rule does seem to
authorize a warrantless search of the passenger compartment of an
automobile in such situations. 134
Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion in Belton also raised the question of whether Belton's per se rule applies only to automobiles. 13~ The
majority in Belton did not indicate whether their rule applies as well to
vans, recreational vehicles, pickup trucks, trucks, and buses. 136
130. See 453 U.S. at 456, 467.
131. 433 U.S. I (1977).
132. 453 U.S. at 462. The majority in Belton did not cite or discuss Preston v. United States,
376 U.S. 364 (1964) or Dyke v. Taylor Implement Mfg. Co., 391 U.S. 216 (1968), cases in which the
Court stated that a warrantless search of an automobile cannot be upheld under Chimel as a search
incident to a lawful arrest when the automobile is not searched until after its occupants have been
taken from the automobile to jailor to a courthouse. See supra note 30.
133. Justice Brennan stated in dissent that "the result would presumably be the same even if
[the arresting officer) had handcuffed Belton and his companions in the patrol car before placing
them under arrest. ... " 453 U.S. at 468. See State v. Alston, 88 N.J. 211, 235 n.15, 440 A.2d 1311,
1323 n. 15 (1981).
134. Additional problems in applying Belton's per se rule may be presented when police grant
an arrestee permission to secure the automobile and its contents before being taken to jail, or to drive
his automobile to the police station or other government office where bail will be posted. See W. LA
FAVE, supra note 6, § 7.I(c).
135. 453 U.S. at 470 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
136. The court in United States v. Wiga, 662 F.2d 1325 (9th Cir. 1981), noted "the physical
differences between typical passenger automobiles and motor homes," id. at 1332 n. 7, but concluded that Belton authorized the warrantless search of the interior passenger areas of a motor home
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Even if this problem is resolved by limiting the rule to automobiles
(which is the way Justice Stewart stated it I3 '), it will often be difficult to
distinguish the' 'interior" of an automobile's' 'passenger compartment"
(which is subject to a warrantless search under Belton's per se rule) from
the automobile's "trunk" (which cannot be searched under Belton
without a warrant). The majority in Belton stated that closed containers,
including closed glove compartments, can be searched without a
warrant, 138 but as Justice Brennan noted in dissent, the majority did not
indicate whether that ruling applied to a locked glove compartment, the
interior of door panels, or the area under an automobile's
floorboards. 139 An even more troublesome problem noted by Justice
Brennan l40 is that the Court does not define the passenger compartment
of a station wagon, hatchback, or taxicab with a glass panel separating
the driver's compartment from the rest of the taxi's interior. 141 Similar
problems will arise in defining the "interior of the passenger compartment" of a van, recreational vehicle, and bus (if such vehicles are

because the search was "directly related to the same fundamental justifications which dictate the
results in ... Belton-i.e., the preservation of evidence and the discovery of weapons that the
arrestee may use to escape or harm the arresting officer." Id. at 1332.
Justice Brennan also asked in his Belton dissent whether the majority's per se rule permits police
to enter and search a house without a warrant upon arresting a suspect they saw walking out of the
house after they had probable cause to believe a crime was being committed in the house as a result of
peering into the house from the outside. 453 U.S. at 470 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The Court,
however, in Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30 (1970), held that Chimel does not permit a house to be
searched without a warrant when a person is arrested outside the house. The Court in Vale stated
that "if a search of a house is to be upheld as incident to an arrest, that arrest must take place inside
the house, ... not somewhere outside-whether two blocks away, ... twenty feet away, ... or on
the sidewalk near the front." 399 U.S. at 33-34 (citations omitted). The majority in Belton did not
cite or discuss Vale.
137. See 453 U.S. at 460.
138. Id. at 460 n. 4.
139. Id. at 470 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The majority in Belton also did not indicate, as noted
earlier, whether other types of locked "containers" can be opened without a warrant. See supra
notes 66-68 and accompanying text.
140. 453 U.S. at 470 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
141. United States v. Russell, 670 F.2d 323 (D.C. Cir. 1982), held that a hatchback
automobile's luggage storage area, which is accessible from inside the automobile, is the "interior of
the passenger compartment" of such an automobile within the meaning of Belton's per se rule. Conceivably under the Russell rationale the entire interior of a station wagon, likewise accessible from
the inside of the vehicle, is the "interior of the passenger compartment" within the meaning of the
Belton rule. Professor Yale Kamisar agrees with Professor Wayne La Fave, see W. LA FAVE, supra
note 6, § 7.1 (1982 Supp.), that under Belton "the 'interior' or 'passenger compartment' of a vehicle
included all space 'reachable' without exiting the vehicle." KAMISAR, 4th Amendment Hatchback,
Washington Post, Oct. 15, 1981, at A29, col. 3. Under this theory, some areas of the bed ofa pickup
truck that can be reached from the cab through a sliding window or panel might be defined as the
"passenger compartment" of the pickup, and subject to a warrantless search under Belton assuming
that a pickup truck is an "automobile" within the meaning of Belton.
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"automobiles" in the Belton sense). If the Court's goals are to provide
clear-cut guidelines delimiting the authority of the police, to protect the
police and the public from arrestees using weapons carried in an
automobile, and to prevent arrestees from concealing, destroying, or
removing evidence that may be in an automobile, it follows that the entire
interiors of station wagons, hatchbacks, and vans, and both the cabs and
the cargo areas of pickup trucks and trucks, should be subject to warrantless searches under Chimel and Belton. If the Court's goal is to infringe
upon rights of privacy only to the extent reasonably necessary to protect
the police and the public, and to prevent the destruction, concealment, or
removal of evidence that may be in an automobile, it seems inescapable
that the determination of whether a particular area of a station wagon,
van, hatchback, truck, pickup truck, or recreational vehicle is within an
arrestee's lunge, grasp, or immediate control should be based upon a case
by case weighing of all relevant facts. 142
An additional problem in applying the Belton rule will occur when
not all of the occupants of an automobile are arrested. 143 If police stop
for a traffic violation an automobile with more than one occupant and
arrest only the driver, locking him in the sealed-off rear passenger
compartment of a police car, a search of the automobile's passenger compartment is difficult to justify under Chime/'s immediate control standard. 144 In such a situation, the automobile's passenger compartment
would not seem to be within the lunge, grasp, or immediate control of the
arrested driver of the automobile. The fact that the automobile's
passenger compartment is within the lunge, grasp, or immediate control
of those passengers not arrested would not justify a warrantless search of
the passenger compartment under Chime/, because Chime/ does not
authorize the warrantless search of an area within the immediate control

142. See supra notes 31-35, 89-91 and accompanying text.
Justice Powell, however, who joined Justice Stewart's opinion in Belton as one of the five
members of the majority, stated in his concurring opinion in Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420,
431 n. 2 (1981), that a recessed luggage compartment at the rear of a station wagon was a "trunk"
and not a "passenger compartment" within the meaning of Belton's per se rule.
The Court in Belton, by referring to the "interior of the passenger compartment" in its opinion, also appears not to include a portable luggage container or rack affixed to the top of an
automobile within the scope of its per se rule, c/. Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 771 (1979)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting), although such a rack may be subject to a warrantless search under a case
by case application of Chimel.
143. Belton only refers to making a warrantless search of an automobile's passenger compartment when "the occupant" has been lawfully arrested. 453 U.S. at 460.
144. See supra notes 126-32 and accompanying text.
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of a person who has not been lawfully arrested. 14s Another problem in
applying Belton when not all of the occupants of an automobile are
arrested may occur when the arresting officer searching the automobile's
passenger compartment discovers a container that is owned or claimed by
one of the non-arrested occupants. 146 The police should be able to

145. 395 U.S. at 755. See C. WHITEBREAD, supra note 6, § 6.02. But if police conducting a
lawful investigation of an automobile that has been stopped for a traffic violation or that has been
involved in an accident have a reasonable belief, based on specific and articulable facts and rational
inferences from those facts, that a non-arrested suspect is potentially dangerous and may gain immediate control of a weapon, they may, without a warrant, search areas of the automobile's passenger
compartment and containers therein in which a weapon could be placed or hidden. Michigan v.
Long, 51 U.S.L.W. 5231 (U.S. June 28,1983). The holding in Long is based upon the reasoning in
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (which authorizes police to make a protective search for weapons
(frisk) of a suspect's person when they have a reasonable suspicion that the suspect is armed and
dangerous to the police or others), Chime/, and Belton. In order to search an automobile without a
warrant under Long, police are not required to have a reasonable belief that a non-arrested suspect is
both armed and dangerous (which is required in order to frisk the person of the suspect under Terry
v. Ohio). The warrantless searches authorized by Long are for the purposes of protecting police (and
other persons near the automobile) in case a non-arrested suspect re-enters the automobile during
the police investigation after breaking away from police control or re-enters the automobile after the
police conclude their investigation, and gains access to a weapon that he might use to injure the
police or others nearby. 51 U.S.L.W. at 5236-37. In Long, the Supreme Court determined that the
police had a reasonable belief that the suspect in question was dangerous because the investigation
occurred near midnight in a rural area, the police had observed a large knife in the interior of the
automobile as the suspect was about to re-enter the automobile, and the suspect appeared to be
under the influence of an intoxicant and had driven his automobile into a ditch while driving erratically at an excessive speed. Id. at 5236. The Court in Long stated that this finding was not affected by
the fact the suspect lawfully possessed the knife that the police observed in the automobile, id. at
5237 n. 16, but the Supreme Court did not otherwise define when police would have a reasonable
belief that a non-arrested occupant of an automobile is dangerous. The majority in Long rejected
Justice Brennan's argument in dissent that police in such cases should pursue "less intrusive, but
equally effective, means of insuring their safety," 51 U.S.L.W. at 5240 (Brennan, J., dissenting),
(such as detaining the suspect outside the automobile, asking him where the automobile'S registration is, and retrieving the registration themselves, id. at 5240 n. 7), on the grounds that police officers, "faced with having to make quick determinations about self-protection and the defense of
innocent citizens in the area," should not have to "also decide instantaneously what 'less intrusive'
alternative exists to ensure that any threat presented by the suspect will be neutralized." 51
U.S.L. W. at 5237 n. 16. But the searches authorized under Long are solely for the purpose of finding
weapons; such searches are not for the purpose of finding evidence. [d. at 5236 n. 14.
146. If the officer opens such a container and discovers an item in the container that incriminates only another occupant, that incriminated occupant probably would not have standing to
challenge the admissibility of the item unless he established a right of joint possession or use in the
item. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978), and United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727 (1980),
discussed supra note 6; and Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98 (1980). Whether an occupant of an
automobile would have standing to challenge the search and seizure of a container and its contents
when he does not own or have a present possessory interest or right of use in the container or its contents, but does own the automobile in which the container was found, has not been addressed
explicitly by the Supreme Court. Whether an occupant of an automobile would have standing to
challenge the opening by police of a container he does own when that container is found within an
automobile he does not own or lease also is unclear. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978).

32

GMU LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 6: 1

conduct a warrantless search of such containers under Chimel if such
containers are within the actual lunge, grasp, or immediate control of an
arrested occupant of an automobile, because Chimel does not limit police
searches of the immediate control area to items of personal property
owned by the arrestee. 147 Still, Chadwick should prohibit the warrantless
search of such containers when the containers are within the exclusive
control of the police l48 and there are no exigent circumstances. 149

III.

WARRANTLESS SEARCHES OF AUTOMOBILES UNDER THE
"AUTOMOBILE" EXCEPTION (CARROLL DOCTRINE)

Under the' 'automobile exception" to the general requirement that a
warrant precede a search or seizure (also known as the Carroll doctrine 1 SO), police may stop and search an automobile without a warrant if
two criteria are met. First, they must have probable cause to believe that
the automobile contains contraband or other items that can be seized
under the fourth amendment. I S I Second, there must be exigent cir-

147. See supra notes 21-28 and accompanying text.
148. See supra notes 42-43, 48-49 and accompanying text.
149. See supra notes 44-45 and infra note 205 and accompanying text.
150. This reference is to Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925), in which the Supreme
Court first recognized this exception. This exception should be called the Carroll doctrine rather than
the automobile exception, because it extends beyond automobiles to airplanes, ships, and motorboats to the extent that they are inherently mobile and can be quickly moved out of the jurisdiction
before a warrant can be obtained. See id. at 153; W. LA FAVE, supra note 6, § 7.2 at 508-09 n. 2.
United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. I, 11 (1977), however, refused to extend this exception to
authorize warrantless searches of movable personal property, such as luggage. See supra note 41.
The automobile exception has also been held inapplicable to motor homes on the grounds that
they have tinted glass or shades so that passers-by cannot peer in and are "in some senses more akin
to a house than a car." United States v. Williams, 630 F.2d 1322,1326 (9th Cir. 1980).
151. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. at 149; United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982). Such
probable cause can be based upon facts personally obtained by law enforcement officials and observations personally made by them, Carroll, 267 U.S. 132; Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583 (1974); by
information provided by informants, Ross, 456 U.S. 798; Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979),
or by witnesses or victims of crime, Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970); Texas v. White, 423
U.S. 67 (1975); Colorado v. Bannister, 449 U.S. 1 (1980). Probable cause also may be established on
the basis of an anonymous tip corroborated by lawful observations of the inside of an automobile by
police, United States v. Bryant, 580 F.2d 812 (5th Cir. 1978), or by information acquired and observations made by police after they have made a lawful investigative stop of an automobile. Texas v.
Brown, 103 S. Ct. 1525 (1983); United States v. Pillo, 522 F. Supp. 855 (M.D. Pa. 1981).
The Supreme Court recently has adopted a "totality of circumstances" test for determining
when there is probable cause to believe that seizable items will be found in a particular place. Illinois
v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 2317 (1983). The Gales Court abandoned the stricter "two-pronged test" for
probable cause of Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964), and Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410
(1969), which required the prosecution to establish both the basis of knowledge and the veracity of
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cum stances making it impracticable or dangerous for them to await the
issuance of a warrant. I 52 The reasons for the' 'automobile exception" are
that "the inherent mobility of automobiles often makes it impracticable
to obtain a warrant" and "the configuration, use, and regulation of
automobiles often may dilute the reasonable expectation of privacy that
exists with respect to differently situated property." I 53
Although the Court has not said so explicitly, the presence of exigent
circumstances within the meaning of the automobile exception is determined on a case by case basis. 154 Exigent circumstances exist under the
automobile exception when it would be impractical or dangerous for one
officer to guard the automobile while other officers obtain a warrant,
because the automobile's occupants, unapprehended accomplices, or
members of the public might remove contraband or other seizable items
from the automobile, or might remove the automobile itself. 155 Factors
relevant in making this determination include the location of the
automobile when it is first stopped or found prior to the search, the
number of law enforcement officers present, and the number of occupants, if any, in the automobile. I 56 Exigent circumstances "do not

the source of the information upon which probable cause was sought to be based. See Moylan, Hearsay and Probable Cause: An Aguilar and Spinelli Primer, 25 MERCER L. REV. 741 (1974).
The first cases allowing warrantless searches of automobiles under the automobile exception
involved searches for the seizure of contraband (such as illicit bootleg liquor), Chambers v.
Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 62 n.7 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Later
cases have involved the search for and seizure of evidence, fruits, and instrumentalities of crime.
Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42; Texas v. White, 423 U.S. 67 (1975); Colorado v. Bannister, 449
U.S. 1 (1980). See generally, Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
Although the Supreme Court has not addressed the issue, most lower courts have held that an
automobile can be searched without a warrant under the automobile exception when law enforcement officials have probable cause (reasonable grounds) to believe that the automobile contains
some type of seizable item, but do not know or even suspect what specific type of item is in the
automobile (so that a search warrant particularly describing the items to be seized could not be
issued in accordance with the fourth amendment). See W. LA FAVE, supra note 6, § 7.2 (d). In such
cases, these courts have had difficulty defining the permissible scope of a warrantless automobile
exception search. [d.; see infra notes 180-321 and accompanying text.
152. Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. at 51; Coolidgev. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 478-79
(1971); Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583 (1974) (plurality opinion).
A warrantless search of an automobile is permitted under the automobile exception if these two
criteria are met even when the police do not seize the automobile. United States v. Modica, 663 F .2d
1173 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 989 (1982).
153. Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 761 (1979)(citations omitted). See also United States
v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. I, 12-13 (1977), discussed supra note 41; Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S.
132 (1925).
154. See Chambers V. Maroney, 399 U.S. at 51; Coolidge V. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443,
458-64 (plurality opinion), 478-80 (1971).
155. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 458-64 (1971)(plurality opinion); England v.
State, 274 Md. 264, 335 A.2d 98 (1975).
156. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 458-64 (plurality opinion), 478-80 (1971).

34

GMU LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 6: 1

dissipate simply because the particular occupants ofthe vehicle may have
been removed from the car, arrested, or otherwise restricted in their
freedom of movement. ... The car is readily moveable until such time as
it is seized, removed from the scene and securely impounded by the
police. Until then it is potentially accessible to third persons who might
move or damage it or remove or destroy evidence contained in it." In
Furthermore, exigent circumstances are not limited to those occasions
when the defendant has been alerted to police actions taken against him,
because of the possibility that unapprehended accomplices or members
of the public might remove evidence from the automobile or take or drive
it away.ISS The Court has always found exigent circumstances when an
automobile is stopped by law enforcement officers while being operated
on a public road or highway.ls9 This situation, however, is not the only
157. State v. Alston, 88 N.J. 211,440 A.2d 1311, 1323 (1981).
158. Commonwealth v. Burgwin, 292 Pa. Super. 273, 437 A.2d 41 (1981).
In United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982), the Court noted that "historically warrantless
searches of vessels, wagons, and carriages-as opposed to fixed premises such as a home or other
building-had been considered reasonable by Congress," id. at 805, because in the case of "a search
of a ship, motorboat, wagon or automobile, for contraband goods, ... it is not practicable to secure
a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the
warrant must be sought." [d. at 806 (quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. at 153). "Thus, since
its earliest days Congress had recognized the impracticability of securing a warrant in cases involving
the transportation of contraband goods. (In light of this established history, individuals always had
been on notice that movable vessels may be stopped and searched on facts giving rise to probable
cause that the vehicle contains contraband, without the protection afforded by a magistrate's prior
evaluation of those facts.) It is this impracticability, viewed in historical perspective, that provided
the basis for the Carroll decision. Given the nature of an automobile in transit, the Court recognized
that an immediate intrusion is necessary if police officers are to secure the illicit substance. In this
class of cases, the Court held that a warrantless search of an automobile is not unreasonable."
United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. at 806-07.
United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. at 807 n. 9, stated that "the decision in Carrol/was not based on
the fact that the only course available to the police was an immediate search .... [Allthough a
failure to seize a moving automobile believed to contain contraband might deprive officers of the
illicit goods, once a vehicle itself has been stopped the exigency does not necessarily justify a warrantless search .... " The Court in Ross noted that in Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970),
the Court' 'refused to adopt a rule that would permit a warrantless seizure but prohibit a warrantless
search. The Court held that if police officers have probable cause to justify a warrantless seizure of
an automobile on a public roadway, they may conduct an immediate search of the contents of that
vehicle. 'For constitutional purposes, we see no difference between on the one hand seizing and
holding a car before presenting the probable cause issue to a magistrate and on the other hand carrying out an immediate search without a warrant. Given probable cause to search, either course is
reasonable underthe Fourth Amendment.' Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. at 52." 456 U.S. at 807
n. 9. See infra note 176.
159. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925); Hustyv. United States, 282 U.S. 694 (1939);
Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970); Arkansas
v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979); United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982); Michigan v. Thomas,
102 S. Ct. 3079 (1982) (per curiam).
In Michigan v. Thomas, 102 S. Ct. at 3081, the Supreme Court observed that its prior decisions
had established the rule "that when police officers have probable cause to believe there is contra-
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example of exigent circumstances. 160 The Court has also permitted a warrantless search of an automobile under the automobile exception when a
lone police officer encountered the operator and two passengers of an
automobile he had been following. 161
In Cardwell v. Lewis, 162 a plurality of four members of the Supreme
Court found exigent circumstances to have been present at the time an
unoccupied automobile parked in a public lot was searched and seized by
police without a warrant. Exigent circumstances were present, because
there "was incentive and potential for the car's removal"; the
automobile's owner had been arrested; he was aware that the police
believed that the automobile itself was incriminating evidence; 163 and, he

band inside an automobile that has been stopped on the road, the officers may conduct a warrantless
search of the vehicle, even after it has been impounded and is in police custody." The Court in
Thomas then stated that' 'it is clear that the justification to conduct such a warrantless search does
not vanish once the car has been immobilized; nor does it depend upon a reviewing court's assessment of the likelihood in each particular case that the car would have been tampered with, during the
period required for the police to obtain a warrant." [d. (footnote omitted). The Thomas Court
agreed that even if "exigent circumstances" were a "necessary predicate" to a search of an
automobile which police have stopped on the road, such an exigency is presented by the "clear
possibility that the occupants of the vehicle could have had unknown confederates who would return
to remove the secreted contraband." [d. at 3081 n. 2 (quoting People v. Thomas, 106 Mich. App.
601,609,308 N.W. 2d 170,174 (1981) (Deneweth, J., dissenting), rev'd 102 S. Ct. 3079 (1982».
Justice White, in his concurring and dissenting opinion in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403
U.S. at 525, noted that in Husty police obtained information from an informant that gave them
probable cause to believe that a particular automobile parked at a specific location contained
seizable items. Later, the police discovered the automobile parked and unattended, but waited until
Husty and others entered the automobile and started to drive away. At that point, and without
obtaining a warrant, they stopped the automobile and searched it. As Justice White also noted in
Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 526, the Court in Husty upheld the warrantless stop and search as reasonable
under the fourth amendment because the police did "not know when Husty would come to the car or
how soon it would be removed" and, therefore, the officers were not "required to speculate upon
the chances of successfully carrying out the search, after the delay and withdrawal from the scene of
one or more officers which would have been necessary to procure a warrant." Husty v. United
States, 282 U.S. at 701.
160. Justice White argued in his concurring and dissenting opinion in Coolidge that police
should be able to search an automobile under the automobile exception when there is probable
cause, whether an automobile is stopped while moving, parked on the street, or in a person's
driveway, because "in both situations the probability of movement at the instance of family or
friends is equally great. ... " 403 U.S. at 525 (White, J., concurring and dissenting).
161. Colorado v. Bannister, 449 U.S. 1 (1980) (per curiam). The Court in Bannister did not
explicitly discuss why the facts of the case satisfied the exigent circumstances requirement of the
automobile exception. It simply upheld the warrantless seizure of evidence the officer observed
inside the car after he approached it and which he had probable cause to believe were seizable items.
[d. at 4. See Scher v. United States, 305 U.S. 251 (1938) and the analysis of Scher in Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 459 n. 17 (1971) (plurality opinion).
162. 417 U.S. 583 (1974).
163. The automobile had been used to push another automobile containing the body of a
murder victim over an embankment. [d. at 586.
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had requested his attorney to see "that his wife and family got the
car. "164 (The plurality in Cardwell, however, did not state that the police
overheard the defendant making this request to his attorney.) The
plurality found exigent circumstances, despite the fact that "for some
time prior to arrest"16S the police had had probable cause to believe that
the automobile in question constituted evidence and an instrumentality
of crime:
[T]he right to search on probable cause and the reasonableness of seizing a car
under exigent circumstances are not foreclosed if a warrant was not obtained
at the first practicable moment. Exigent circumstances with regard to vehicles
are not limited to situations where probable cause is unforeseeable and arises
only at the time of arrest. ... The exigency may arise at any time, and the fact
that the police might have obtained a warrant earlier does
not negate the possibility of a current situation's necessitating prompt
police action. 166

164. [d. at 595.
The plurality stated that the subsequent examination of the exterior of the automobile, during
which a sample of paint and an imprint of a tire were taken, was not a search within the meaning of
the fourth amendment, so that a warrant was not required for this exterior examination. [d. at
588-92. See supra note 6. Justice Powell concurred in the judgment on different grounds. Four
Justices dissented, primarily on the grounds that there were no exigent circumstances within the
meaning of the automobile exception, 417 U.S. at 596-99 (Stewart, J., dissenting). See infra notes
167-69 and accompanying text.
See also England v. State, 274 Md. 264, 334 A.2d 98 (1975), in which exigent circumstances
were found justifying the search of an unoccupied automobile parked on the street in front of the
defendant's house. In England, the Court based its conclusion on the facts that, although the defendant was in custody, an accomplice was at large and the automobile appeared unexpectedly in front
of the defendant's house after the police had been searching for it for three days.
165. 417 U.S. at 595.
166. [d.

The Supreme Court has never held that exigent circumstances will not be found if it is established that the police waited until an item was placed in an automobile as a pretext for taking advantage of the automobile exception. See United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 840 (I 982)(Marshall, J.,
dissenting). In Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128 (1978), the Court suggested that the SUbjective
motive of police officers is irrelevant in determining whether their conduct was unreasonable in
violation of the fourth amendment.
See Husty v. United States, 282 U.S. 694 (1931), discussed supra note 159; Nair v. State, 51 Md.
App. 234, 442 A.2d 196 (1982) (exigent circumstances held to be present even though police had
probable cause to obtain a warrant authorizing search of automobile two days earlier on the grounds
that police were under no obligation to conclude an investigation or arrest the defendants at the time
that probable cause was first obtained); Commonwealth v. Burgwin, 292 Pa. Super. 273, 437 A.2d
41 (1981) (exigent circumstances held to be present when police inadvertently came upon an
automobile while they were on the way to obtain a warrant authorizing search of that automobile,
even though police voluntarily delayed seeking the warrant until two and one-half hours after they
had acquired probable cause to search the automobile). Cf. State v. Ercolano, 79 N.J. 25, 397 A.2d
1062 (1979) (no exigent circumstances held to be present when police had probable cause to obtain a
warrant authorizing search of an automobile in advance of search of the automobile and also knew
well in advance of the search that it would be found outside an apartment which they had a warrant
to search).
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Justice Stewart's dissenting opinion, joined by three other Justices,
argued that exigent circumstances were not present, because the defendant (the owner of the automobile) and the keys to his automobile "were
securely within police custody ... well before the time the automobile
was seized," and thus "there was ... absolutely no likelihood that the
respondent could have either moved the car or meddled with it during the
time necessary to obtain a search warrant. And there was no realistic
possibility that anyone else was in a position to do so. "167 Justice Stewart
also pointed out that the defendant had been aware for several months
that the police were investigating him and had known for at least a day
before the seizure of his automobile that the police wished to question
him.168 Furthermore, the police had had time to obtain an arrest warrant
for the defendant based upon a showing of probable cause that also
would have supported issuance of a search warrant authorizing search of
the automobile. 169
In contrast with Cardwell is Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 170 a:noth~r
Gase qealing with the seizure and search of a parked and unoccupied
~utomobile, and the only such case in which a majority of the Justices on
the Supreme Court have held that there were no exigent circumstances
within the meaning of the automobile exception. In Coolidge, the
automobile in question was seized, searched two days later, held over a
year, and then searched again twice. All of this police conduct was congpct~q pursuant to a search warrant that was held invalid by the Supreme
Coprt. This holding placed the burden on the St~te to esta\llish th~t the
(npw) warrantless seizure and search of that automobile w~s vaHg. The
rn~jority in Coolidge determined that the automobile ip question w~s
s.~i?e~ while it was parked in the qriveway of the owner's home ~Qd was
npt being used for an illegal purpose, and at a time when tQe police had
prgb~ble cause and had had sufficient opportunity to obt~ifl il warr~nt.
Th~ {::ollrt thus concluded that there were no exigem circum.stilI}G~~ justifyjng the warrantless seizure and search of the ilutomobHe \.mq~r the
~ytompbile exception. 171 A plurality of four Justices ~lso n9t~q, ~s additi~m'!! b~rs to application of the automobile exceptlon, th~t the
gefen9~nt, the automobile's owner, had been arrested, anq that his wife,
the only other possible driver of the automobile, had been removed from
tQ~ sGene by police officers who stayed with her until after the warrantless

167. 417

u.s. at 598 (Stewart, J., dissenting).

168. [d. at 599.
169. [d. at 598.

170. 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
171. [d. at 479,484.
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seizure of the automobile. 172 Justice Black, in a concurring and dissenting opinion joined by Justice Blackmun, argued that the plurality incorrectly assumed that "the police should, or even could, continue to keep
petitioner's wife effectively under house arrest," and that the police did
not act unreasonably in refusing to assume "that no one else had any
motivation to alter or remove the car. "173 Justice White, in a concurring
and dissenting opinion joined by Chief Justice Burger, argued that the
automobile exception should permit police to conduct warrantless
searches of automobiles they have probable cause to believe contain
seizable items in two situations: first, when an automobile is in motion
prior to being stopped and searched and, second, when an automobile is
unattended and parked on the street or in the driveway of a person's
home, because "in both situations the probability of movement at the
instance of family or friends is equally clear." 174
As these decisions indicate, exigent circumstances under the
automobile exception are determined on a case by case basis. This conclusion is supported by the fact that each time the Court has applied the
automobile exception, it has analyzed in great detail the particular facts
of the case before determining whether exigent circumstances were
present. 17S In substance, the Court appears to approach the exigent circumstances issue by determining whether the police could have obtained
a warrant before seizing or searching an automobile, and what the consequences would have been if the police, after stopping or encountering the
automobile, had sought a warrant before seizing and searching it. 176

172. [d. at 460. See Humphrey v. State, 39 Md. App. 484, 386 A.2d 1238 (1978).
173. 403 U.S. at 505 (Black, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
174. [d. at 525 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Justice Marshall argued in dissent in United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 830 n. 2 (1982), that
"the fact that the police are able initially to remove the occupants from the car does not remove the
justification for an immediate search. If police could not conduct an immediate search of a stopped
automobile, they would often be left with the difficult task of deciding what to do with the occupants
while a warrant is obtained. In the case of a parked automobile, by contrast, if the automobile is
unoccupied, this problem is not presented."
175. See supra notes 154-74 and accompanying text.
176. The interpretation of the exigent circumstances element of the automobile exception by
lower federal courts and by state courts is analyzed in depth in W. LA FAVE, supra note 6, §§ 7.2 (b),
(c); this article will not duplicate that analysis.
When exigent circumstances justifying a warrantless automobile exception search of an
automobile are present at the time the vehicle is stopped or first encountered by law enforcement
officials, the officials are permitted by the automobile exception to tow or drive it to a police station
or an impoundment lot and search it there without securing a warrant. Chambers v. Maroney, 399
U.S. 42 (1970); Texas v. White, 423 U.S. 67 (1975) (per curiam). The Court in these two cases has
permitted such delayed searches without requiring law enforcement officials to explain or establish
good cause as to why they delayed searching the automobile until well after it was initially stopped or
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found by them. See Texas v. White, 423 U.S. at 69 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Harlan, concurring in part and dissenting in part in Chambers, disagreed with this per se rule permitting such
delayed automobile exception searches on the grounds that an exception from the rule generally
requiring a warrant for a search should be permitted only when the actual facts of the case before the
court establish exigent circumstances. 399 U.S. at 61 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part). Cf. supra notes 1-5 and accompanying text. The Court also has imposed no limits on the
length of the delay permissible between the seizure of an automobile and its search at the station
house or impoundment lot. See People v. White, 68 Mich. App. 348, 242 N.W.2d 579 (1976)
(warrantless search next morning 18 hours after automobile seized late the afternoon of the
preceding day upheld under the automobile exception); People v. Emert, I Ill. App. 3d 993, 274
N .E.2d 364 (1971) (warrantless search three days after seizure of automobile held invalid under
automobile exception). In support of this per se rule permitting delayed automobile exception
searches, the Court reasoned that it is a "debatable question" as to whether seizure and immobilization of the automobile until a search warrant is obtained is a greater or lesser intrusion than immediately searching the automobile at the station house by law enforcement officials; thus, for fourth
amendment purposes, there is "no difference between on the one hand seizing and holding a car
before presenting the probable cause issue to a magistrate and on the other hand carrying out an
immediate search without a warrant." Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. at 51. Ross reaffirmed the
holdings in Chambers v. Maroney and Texas v. White on the following grounds:
These decisions are based on the practicalities of the situations presented and a
realistic appraisal of the relatively minor protection that a contrary rule would provide for
privacy interests. Given the scope of the initial intrusion caused by a seizure of an
automobile-which often could leave the occupants stranded on the highway-the court
rejected an inflexible rule that would force police officers in every case either to post a
guard at the vehicle While a warrant is obtained or to tow the vehicle itself to the station.
Similarly, if an immediate search on the scene could be conducted, but not one at the station if the vehicle is impounded, police often simply would search the vehicle on the
street-at no advantage to the occupants, yet possibly at certain cost to the police. The
rules as applied in particular cases may appear unsatisfactory. They reflect, however, a
reasoned application of the more general rule that if an individual gives the police probable
cause to believe a vehicle is transporting contraband, he luses the right to proceed on his
way without official interference.
United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 807 n. 9 (1982). Justice Harlan, however, concurring in part and
dissenting in part in Chambers v. Maroney, argued that the majority's reasoning in Chambers did
not support the per se rule it adopted, because the majority, "unable to decide whether search or
temporary seizure is the 'lesser' intrusion, in this case authorized both." 399 U.S. at 63 n. 8 (Harlan,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). He also noted that the Court approved the warrantless
searches of the automobile at the police station, after the warrantless temporary seizure of the
automobile, "without even an inquiry into the officers' ability promptly to take their case before a
magistrate." Id. See also Texas v. White, 423 U.S. at 69 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Harlan
concluded his opinion in Chambers by arguing that the "lesser intrusion" would be the "simple
seizure of the car for the period-perhaps a day-necessary to enable the officers to obtain a warrant," 399 U.S. at 63, and that temporary seizure and immobilization of an automobile, without a
warrantless search of the automobile, would prevent removal of evidence while a warrant was
obtained. Id. He conceded, however, that when it would be impracticable to immobilize the
automobile for the time necessary to obtain a warrant, such as when a single police officer arrests the
occupants of an automobile and must take them to the police station, the automobile exception
should permit the officer to make a warrantless on-the-spot search of the automobile ifthere is probable cause to believe it contains seizable items. Id. at 64 n. 9. (He also noted that if his theory was
followed, a person could consent to the warrantless search of his automobile in order to avoid temporary seizure of his automobile while police obtain a search warrant.)
A majority of lower federal and state courts have refused to interpret the automobile exception
as requiring police, when they have probable cause to believe that an automobile contains seizable
items and there are exigent circumstances, to post a guard and to deny use and access to the
automobile while other police obtain a warrant authorizing the search of the automobile. See W. LA
FAVE, supra note 6, § 7.2(c).
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Unlike a warrantless search of an automobile incident to a lawful
arrest under Chimel and Belton, the warrantless search of an automobile
under the automobile exception does not require as a prerequisite that an
occupant of the automobile have been arrested contemporaneously with
the search of the automobile. 177 In fact, there need not be any occupants
in an automobile for the automobile exception to apply, 178 although the
absence of occupants in an automobile may cause a court to invalidate
the warrantless search on the grounds that no exigent circumstances were
present. 179 A warrantless search of an automobile under the automobile
exception is permitted when there is probable cause to believe that there
are seizable items in the automobile that may be removed or destroyed
before a warrant is obtained (not necessarily by the occupants of the
automobile; possibly by unapprehended accomplices or members of the
public). A warrantless search of an automobile as a search incident to a
lawful arrest under Chimel and Belton, on the other hand, does not
require probable cause to believe or even suspect that there are seizable
items such as weapons or evidence in the automobile. Under Belton, a
warrantless search of an automobile is permitted to prevent evidence
from being concealed, removed, or destroyed, and to protect the safety
of the arresting officers and nearby members of the public in the event
that the automobile contains evidence or a weapon and an arrested occupant lunges or grasps for such evidence or weapon.
When the police do not have reason to believe that the item to be
seized is in a specific area of or container within the automobile, the
automobile exception permits police to search areas of an automobile
where they could reasonably expect to find the items.I8o A warrantless
177. Ehrlich v. State, 42 Md. App. 730, 403 A.2d 371, 373 (1979).
178. See Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583 (1974); England v. State, 274 Md. 264, 334
A.2d 98 (1975).
179. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971). Cj. Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S.
583,596 (1974) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
180. United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982). In Ross, the Court indicated that police may
rip open upholstery without a warrant, id. at 818, 823 (at least when the upholstery feels harder than
is ordinarily the case, id. at 804, quoting from Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. at 174), and may
sellrch concealed compartments under the dashboard, 456 U.S. at 818,825, and the glove compartment. [d. at 821,823.
See, e.g., Daugherty v. State, 40 Md. App. 535, 392 A.2d 1165 (1978)(opening by game warden
of paper bag and seizure by him of three plastic bags filled with marijuana, after he determined by
feeling the outside of the bag that it did not contain anything sufficiently hard or heavy to be game,
held to exceed the permissible scope of an automobile exception search); Madonado v. State, 528
S. W .2d 234 (Tex. Crim. 1975) (examination of identification numbers and search of glove compartment, floorboards, and rear area of truck believed to be stolen, where documents or other items that
would disclose the true owner's identity might be found, permissible under the automobile exception, but ripping up the floorboards of the rear area of the truck (under which packages of marijuana were found), held to exceed the permissible scope of an automobile exception search).
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search of the trunk of an automobile, therefore, may be permitted under
the automobile exception when police have probable cause to believe that
a seizable item is located somewhere in the automobile, but do not know
where in the automobile it is. 181 A warrantless search of the trunk of an
automobile, however, is not permitted as a search incident to a lawful
arrest under Belton. 182 Furthermore, the scope of a search of an
automobile under the automobile exception is not limited to the area
within the lunge, grasp, or immediate control of an arrested occupant of
the automobile. 183 If law enforcement officials, however, have probable
cause to believe that a seizable item is located in a specific area of an
automobile (which might be the case if probable cause is based on an
informant's tip), then, under the automobile exception, they usually
should be required to search without a warrant only that specified area of
the automobile. 184 It is possible, however, that police officers in such a
situation might approach an occupied automobile and observe a furtive
gesture by an occupant adjacent to the area of the automobile believed by
the officers to contain seizable items. In such a case, and if they do not
find the seizable items in the specific area in which they have probable
cause to believe the items will be found, 18S they should be permitted to
search the area within that occupant's immediate control. 186 Another
example might involve police officers who, having probable cause to
believe that a specific quantity of a particular type of seizable item will be
found in a specified area of an automobile, find less than such specific
quantity in that specified area. In this situation, they should be permitted
to search other areas of the automobile where the additional unseized
quantities of that item might be hidden. Such additional searching should
be permitted, because suspicious criminals might decide, at some time
after the police obtained the information upon which they based their
probable cause, to transfer some or all of the seizable items to a different
181. Ehrlich v. State, 42 Md. App. 730, 403 A.2d 371 (1979). Cf, State v. Astalos, 160
N.J. Super. 407, 390 A.2d 144 (1978). See also People v. Fraijo, 78 Cal. App.3d 977, 144 Cal.
Rptr. 424 (1978).
182. See supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text.
183. Ehrlich v. State, 42 Md. App. 730, 403 A.2d 371,373 (1979).
184. Cf, United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982), discussed infra notes 250-321 and accom:
panying text; Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979) (police who had probable cause to believe
that a particular suitcase located in an automobile contained seizable items permitted to seize the
suitcase without a warrant, but needed a warrant to open the suitcase and seize its contents), analyzed infra notes 195-212 and accompanying text.
185. Cf, Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 449 n.9 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting);
and Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 770 n. 3 (1979) (Blackmun, J., dissenting), discussed infra
note 206.
186. C/. Chime) v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969). See supra notes 31-35 and infra note 206
and accompanying text.
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area of the automobile to reduce the likelihood that the entire quantity
might be intercepted by the police or criminal adversaries. 187
The automobile exception, however, does not authorize the
warrantless search of an occupant of an automobile that the police have
probable cause to believe contains seizable items when that search is to
determine if the occupant has concealed such seizable items on his person. 188 The reason for this prohibition is twofold: first, police cannot
obtain a search warrant authorizing the search of the person of an occupant of an automobile when they have probable cause to believe only that
seizable items are located somewhere in the automobile; and, second, the
scope of a warrantless search under the automobile exception should not
be greater than would be permitted under a search warrant. 189
A recurring problem with respect to the permissible scope of a search
under the automobile exception occurs when police officers, while
searching an automobile which they reasonably believe contains a particular type of seizable item, discover some of that type of item but have
no information as to the quantity of that type of item in the automobile or
where in the automobile to find it. The Court has not explicitly decided
whether police in such a situation can continue to search the automobile
for additional quantities. 190 A further search should be permitted only
if the circumstances of the particular case give the police probable cause
to believe that there are within the automobile additional quantities
of the type or kind of seizable items already discovered and seized within
the automobile. 191

187. Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. at 449 n. 9 (Stevens, J., dissenting); and Arkansas v.
Sanders, 442 U.S. at 770 n. 3 (Blackmun, J., dissenting), discussed infra note 206.
188. United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581 (1948).
189. [d. In Commonwealth v. Burgwin, 292 Pa. Super. 273,437 A.2d 41 (1981) the court held
that if police have probable cause to believe that the driver of an automobile is carrying a weapon or
another seizable item on his person, and if there are exigent circumstances, the automobile exception
authorizes police, without a warrant, to stop the automobile and search the person of that individual. The Burgwin court, however, did not cite or distinguish Di Re.
190. Such a factual situation was presented in Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420 (1981),
wherein a police officer, after finding marijuana in the passenger compartment of a station wagon
he had stopped because it had been driven erratically, opened the wagon's tailgate and lifted up the
recessed luggage compartment, in which he discovered 15 pounds of marijuana in two bundles
wrapped in green opaque plastic. The Court in Robbins, however, did not address the issue of
whether the officer exceeded the permissible scope of a search under the automobile exception, and
decided the case on other grounds. See infra notes 215-49 and accompanying text. See also Michigan
v. Thomas, 102 S. Ct. 3079, 3081 n. I (1982), wherein the Court noted that a lower appellate court
"apparently assumed" that the discovery of marijuana in an automobile's glove compartment
"provided probable cause to believe there was contraband hidden elsewhere in the vehicle."
191. In State v. Alston, 88 N.J. 211,440 A.2d 1311 (1981), two police officers, while chasing a
speeding automobile, observed "three of the four occupants moving about in the vehicle, as if
attempting to conceal something." [d., 440 A.2d at 1313. After stopping the automobile, oneofthe
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The most troublesome issue for the Court, however, has been the
issue of whether police may open and inspect the contents of luggage and
other closed opaque containers discovered during an automobile exception search. This issue has been addressed recently by the Court in three
cases l92 that present questions about the extent to which Chadwick'sl93
exclusive control and exigency standards 194 regulate the warrantless
opening and inspection of the contents of luggage, containers, and other
items of personal property discovered in an automobile during an
automobile exception search; the types of personal property subject to
Chadwick's exclusive control standard; and, the permissible scope of the
warrantless search of an automobile under the automobile exception.
In Arkansas v. Sanders,195 police officers had probable cause to
believe that a particular suitcase carried by a disembarking airline

police officers observed shotgun shells in the glove compartment, which had been opened by the
automobile's driver in response to a request by one of the officers for the automobile's registration.
The police then ordered the occupants to leave the automobile, following which one of the officers
entered the automobile to seize the shotgun shells. While doing so, the officer observed an opaque
plastic bag lying on the floor, protruding about 12 inches from under the seat. The bag felt as if
it contained a gun, so the officer opened it. He discovered and seized a sawed-off shotgun. The
officers then made a further search of the passenger compartment, finding and seizing several
revolvers. The court found that the presence of the "shotgun shells in the glove compartment and
the sawed-off shotgun under the front passenger seat, coupled with defendants' furtive and unusual
movements in the back seat before the vehicle was stopped," gave the police probable cause to
conduct the search of the passenger compartment that revealed the two handguns. [d., 440 A.2d
at 1321, 1322.
In Wimberlyv. Superior Court, 16 Cal. 3d 557,128 Cal. Rptr. 641, 547 P.2d417 (1976), a police
officer, after stopping an automobile that he had observed being driven erratically, observed a pipe
and approximately 12 marijuana seeds on the automobile's floor. Smelling the odor of burnt marijuana, he searched the passenger compartment, and found a small quantity of marijuana in the
pocket of a jacket. He then searched the trunk and found a suitcase containing several pounds of
marijuana. The court ruled that the search of the passenger compartment for additional marijuana
was permissible under the automobile exception, because "the observation of even an unusable
quantity of marijuana has been deemed sufficient to justify the search of a vehicle for additional
contraband." [d., 547 P.2d at 421. See Hill v. State, 516 S.W. 2d 361 (Tenn. App. 1974)(warrantless
search of glove compartment upheld under automobile exception after police officer had discovered
plastic bag of marijuana in plain view on the front seat of the automobile). The court in Wimberly,
however, held that the warrantless search of the automobile's trunk was not permissible under the
automobile exception in the absence of "specific articulable facts which gave reasonable cause to
believe that seizable items are, in fact, concealed in the trunk." 547 P .2d at 424. The Wimberly court
concluded that the officer's observations and the discovery of a small amount of marijuana in the
jacket in the passenger compartment only would give the police reasonable grounds to believe that
the occupants were users of marijuana, not dealers of marijuana, and it was thus not reasonable to
infer that additional marijuana was hidden in the trunk.
192. United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982); Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420 (1981);
Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979).
193. 433 U.S. 1 (1977).
194. See supra notes 36-58 and accompanying text.
195. 442 U.S. 753 (1979).
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passenger contained marijuana. The person carrying the suitcase entered
a taxicab, which the police pursued and stopped several blocks from the
airport. Without a warrant or the consent of the owner, the police seized
the suitcase and opened it. The Court held that, although the warrantless
seizure of the suitcase was permissible under the automobile exception
because the police had probable cause to believe that it contained contraband and that it was being driven away, 196 the opening of the suitcase and
the seizure of its contents without a search warrant violated the fourth
amendment to the Constitution. 197 After reiterating the general rules that
a warrant usually is required for a search or seizure,198 and that the
"few" exceptions to the usual requirement of a warrant are "jealously
and carefully drawn," 199 the Court determined that the police, after
seizing the suitcase, should have taken it and its owner to the police station and then obtained a warrant authorizing the search of the suitcase 200
and the seizure of its contents. 201 The Court in Sanders held that Chadwick 202 prohibited the police from opening and searching without a warrant luggage discovered during a warrantless automobile exception
search once they have the luggage within their exclusive control. 203 The
search would be prohibited even if the police have probable cause to

196. Id. at 761. See United States v. Place, 51 U.S.L.W. 4844, 4845 (U.S. June 20, 1983)
("Where law enforcement authorities have probable cause to believe that a container holds contraband or evidence of a crime, but have not secured a warrant, the Court has interpreted the [Fourth)
Amendment to permit seizure of the property, pending issuance of a warrant to examine its contents, if the exigencies of the circumstances demand it or some other recognized exception to the warrant requirement is present"). Cj. Husty v. United States, 282 U.S. 694 (1931), analyzed supra note
159. Chief Justice Burger argued in his concurring opinion in Sanders that the case did not involve an
application of the automobile exception, because, as in Chadwick, the relationship between the suitcase and the taxicab "was purely coincidental." 442 U.S. at 767. He argued that the case simply
involved an application of Chadwick's rule, which generally requires a warrant in order to inspect
the contents of luggage. Id. at 766. This analysis was quoted approvingly by a majority of the Court
in United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. at 811-12.
197. 442 U.S. at 765-66. Consequently, the Court held that the trial court should have suppressed as evidence the marijuana seized in the suitcase at the suitcase owner's state criminal trial on
charges of illegal possession of the marijuana with intent to deliver. See id. at 756, 766.
198. Id. at 758.
199. [d. at 759 (quoting Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 499 (1958».
200. The Sanders Court implicitly assumed that the opening by the police of the unlocked suitcase was a fourth amendment search, which requires a finding that such conduct violates the owner's
actual and reasonable expectations of privacy. See supra note 6. If such police conduct had been held
not to be a fourth amendment search, the opening of the suitcase would not have been subject to the
warrant, probable cause, or reasonableness requirements of the fourth amendment. Id.; see infra
note 208 and accompanying text.
201. 442 U.S. at 766.
202. 433 U.S. I (1977). See supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text.
203. 442 U.S. at 762. See text accompanying notes 48-50.
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believe that the luggage contains seizable items 204 unless "special exigencies of the situation justify the warrantless search. ,,20S In Sanders, the
Court concluded that Chadwick's exclusive control standard required
this result even though the suitcase at issue was not locked and was' 'comparatively small" (when compared with the locked, 200-pound
footlocker involved in Chadwick), because the suitcase, as "a repository
for personal, private effects," was entitled to the protection of the fourth
amendment's warrant requirement. 206

204. Id. at 765.
205. 442 U.S. at 763 n. 11. The Court stated that "generally ... such exigencies will depend
upon the probable contents of the luggage and the suspect's access to those contents-not upon
whether the luggage is taken from an automobile." [d. The Court suggested that such an exigency
would exist if the police had reason to suspect that a suitcase contained a weapon. Id. The Court's
reference to the "suspect's access to those contents" implies that the determination of whether exigent circumstances are present also might be based upon Chimers immediate control standard. Cf,
supra notes 21-35, 44-45. and accompanying text. This latter definition of exigency, however,
appears to be simply a situation in which the suitcase would not be within the exclusive control of the
police within the meaning of Chadwick. See supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text. Sanders'
tests for defining exigency in cases involving the automobile exception, however, should be more
broadly defined to apply to situations in which the suitcase or other container and its contents are
within the immediate control of any occupant of the automobile, whether or not an occupant has
been arrested, because an automobile exception search does not require any occupants of the
automobile to have been arrested. See supra note 177 and accompanying text.
206. 442 U.S. at 762 n. 9.
Chief Justice Burger argued in his concurring opinion in Sanders that the case did not present
"the question of whether a warrant is required before opening luggage when the police have probable cause to believe contraband is located somewhere in the vehicle, but when they do not know
whether, for example, it is inside a piece of luggage in the trunk, in the glove compartment, or concealed in some part of the car's structure." 442 U.S. at 767 (Burger, C. J., concurring). He said that
he was "not sure whether that would be a stronger or weaker case for requiring a warrant to search
the suitcase when a warrantless search of the automobile is otherwise permissible." Id. He added
that' 'it would be better to await a case in which the question must be decided." Id. (Such a case was
presented in United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982), analyzed infra notes 250-321 and accompanying text). The majority in Sanders, however, did not make any distinction between the
hypothetical situation raised by Chief Justice Burger and the situation presented by the facts of
Sanders (wherein the police had probable cause to believe seizable items are in a 'particular piece of
luggage). See supra notes 180-87 and accompanying text. The Court did draw such a distinction
subsequently in United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982), limiting Sanders to cases in which police
have probable cause to believe that a seizable item is located in a specific piece of luggage or container. See infra notes 250-321 and accompanying text.
Justice Blackmun argued in Sanders that, contrary to what he asserted were the implications of
these statements by Chief Justice Burger, the automobile exception might permit the warrantless
search of luggage discovered in an automobile when the police do have probable cause to believe
only that seizable items are somewhere in the automobile, but do not have probable cause to believe
that the items are in any specific container. He argued:
[T]he intrusion on privacy, and consequently the need for the protection of the Warrant Clause, is, if anything, greater when the police search the entire interior area of the
car, including possibly several suitcases, than when they confine their search to a single
suitcase. Moreover, given the easy transferability of articles to and from luggage once it is
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The majority in Sanders supported the application of Chadwick's
exclusive control standards to luggage discovered in automobiles during
a warrantless automobile exception search for two reasons: first, once
police have seized a suitcase and have it securely within their control
the extent of its mobility is not affected by the fact that it was taken
from an automobile;207 and, second, a suitcase in an automobile is not
attended by any lesser expectation of privacy than is associated with luggage taken from other locations. This is so, because' 'the very purpose of
a suitcase is to serve as a repository for personal items when one wishes to
transport them. "208
The Sanders Court did suggest in dictum, however, that some containers and packages other than suitcases and luggage would not be
subject to Chadwick's exclusive control standard requiring a warrant to

placed in a vehicle, the police would be entitled to assume that if contraband was not found
in the suspect suitcase, it would likely be secreted somewhere else in the car. The possibility
the opinion concurring in the judgment would preserve for future decision thus contemplates the following two-step ritual: first, the police would take the targeted suitcase
to the station for a search pursuant to a warrant; then, if the contraband was not discovered in the suitcase, they would return for a warrantless search of other luggage and
compartments of the car. It does not require the adjudication of a future controversy to
reject that result.
442 U.S. at 770 n. 3 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun concluded by arguing that the
Court should adopt a rule permitting the warrantless search and seizure of any personal property
found in an automobile that permissibly was seized and is being searched under the automobile
exception.ld. at 772. See infra note 208. The Court subsequently did adopt a rule authorizing police
to search any containers that might contain the items to be seized when the police have probable
cause only to believe that the items are located somewhere in the automobile. United States v. Ross,
456 U.S. 798 (1982). See infra notes 250-321 and accompanying text.
207. 442 U.S. at 763.
208. Id. at 764. The Court also stated that "one is not less inclined to place private, personal
possessions in a suitcase merely because the suitcase is to be carried in an automobile rather than
transported by other means or temporarily checked or stored." Id. These latter two statements in
Sanders implied that the opening and inspection of the contents of a suitcase discovered in an
automobile are a fourth amendment search. See supra note 200.
The majority in Sanders rejected an argument applying by analogy a statement in Chambers v.
Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970) (analyzed supra note 176), that suggested there is no constitutional difference between a situation in which police search an automobile stopped on a highway without a
warrant under the automobile exception and one in which they hold the automobile but delay the
search until a warrant is obtained. 442 U.S. at 765 n. 14. Application of the analysis to luggage
discovered in an automobile during a search under the automobile exception would have permitted
its warrantless search, but this argument was rejected on the grounds that requiring police to hold a
seized vehicle until a warrant is obtained would impose "severe, even impossible, burdens on many
police departments;" burdens that would not be imposed if police departments are required to seize
and hold personal luggage until a warrant is obtained before opening and searching the contents of
the luggage. Id. (By implication, the Court in Sanders was stating that warrantless searches of
automobiles such as those involved in Chambers (where a moving vehicle was stopped) are not
unreasonable searches because the adverse impact upon law enforcement if a warrant were required
outweighs the intrusions upon personal privacy resulting from such searches. See infra notes 269-73
and accompanying text).
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open containers and inspect their contents. 209 Sanders suggests that two
types of containers can be opened without a warrant: containers, such as
a kit of burglar tools or a gun case, that by "their very nature cannot sup~
port any reasonable expectation of privacy, because their contents can be
inferred from their outward appearance;"210 and containers whose contents are open to "plain view. "211 The Court stated that' 'our decision in
this case means only that a warrant generally is required before personal
luggage can be searched and that the extent to which the Fourth Amendment applies to containers depends not at all upon whether they a:r;e

Justice B1ackmun also argued in dissent in Sanders that police should be permitted under ~he
automobile exception to search luggage and similar containers found in an automobile wit\1o\lt l!,
warrant, because luggage, like an automobile, is mobile, 442 U.S. at 769, because "the exp<:c~aH9n
of privacy in a suitcase found in the car is probably not significantly greater than the expectatiQI.\ ()f
privacy in a locked glove compartment," id., and because the additional intrusion of a search o( p,l,lr~
sonal property is incidental "given the significant encroachment on privacy interests entail"g by a
seizure of personal property .... " [d. at 770. (This last comment by Justice Blackmun, ho~"vex,
was made in a case wherein the warrantless seizure of the suitcase did not violate the fourth amel.\c,Iment, because the police had probable cause to believe it contained contraband and beca':ls~ it migh~
have disappeared to an unknown location if police had delayed seizure until a warrant wl!-s ob~ainecl.
See supra note 194 and accompanying text.)
209. 442 U.S. at 764 n. 13.
210. [d. By implication, the Court was stating that the opening of such a contain,er would ~o~
be a fourth amendment search. See supra note 200, and infra note 228 and accompanying text.
211. 442 U.S. at 764 n. 13. See infra notes 229-31 and accompanying text. By implication, tl,le
Court was saying that the contents of containers observed in plain view during the warrantless s(:arc,1,l
of an automobile under the automobile exception can be seized without a warrant under the pll\h,l
view seizure doctrine. See supra note 57. The Court has not, however, explicitly I,leld tha.~ ~h"
warrantless seizure of items discovered during an automobile exception search must cOR,lply ~it\;\ ~Qc;
plain view seizure doctrine in order to be upheld under the fourth amendment. But see T~x.lI.s v'.,
Brown, 103 S. Ct. 1535 (1983). If, however, the plain view seizure doctrine must be cOR,lpli,€!Q wi~\;I ~o
make such warrantless seizures valid under the fourth amendment, then the prior va.I.ici i.l).tr.IJ,S,IQn,
requirement of the plain view seizure doctrine would be satisfied when the warrantless s,e\l,f£h Qf t.lw
automobile is permissible in scope, see supra notes 180-91, because the warrant,less ~I\\r>;' Q('\\;\e,
automobile would be valid under the automobile exception. See supra note 5,7. 'I:"h.~, ~t:ll!-.c!,<cenel.\t
discovery requirement of the plain view seizure doctrine would be satisfied only ifthepolice !;lid no,t
have probable cause to believe that the item seized would'be discovered witl,liQt,h.e'~~t:~W,Q~~\~: $t!~
supra notes 57 and 151 and text accompanying note 151. The inadvertent di~c.,?,~\:~y ~eq\l,~~emt!t:I,~ W!W
not have to be complied with, however, when the item seized is contraband, or ~ dl!-.~,g~r<?,u,s, Q~ s,~"*1.\
item, or when exigent circumstances are present. See supra note 57. (A warrl!-n,~Ie.s~, s.€!\lr,<\\ 0(' ,,1.\
automobile, of course, is not permitted under the automobile' excepti,,?~ u,nl.es.s exigt;t:ll C;i,rcumstances are present. See supra notes 152-76 and accompanying text.), "
.
The exigent circumstances that justify a warrantless seizure and search of an automobile uncle~
the automobile exception, see supra notes 152-76 and accompanying text, however, are different
from those that justify the warrantless opening and inspection of the contents of a cOQtainer under
Chadwick and Sanders. See supra notes 44-45, 207 and accompanying text.
The third requirement of the plain view seizure doctrine, the immediately apparent requirement, would be satisfied if the police had probable cause to believe that the item seized had a nexus
with criminal activity at the time they first discovered or observed the item. See supra note 57.
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seized from an automobile. ,,212 In so doing, the Court implied that this
dictum might be regarded as persuasive in all cases where the issue
is whether, under Chadwick, a warrant is required to search an item
of personal property.
In two subsequent cases, Robbins v. California 213 and United States
v. Ross, 214 the Court has had to distinguish the types of containers and
items of personal property subject to Chadwick's exclusive control standard and, therefore, requiring a search warrant from those not generally
requiring a warrant.
A majority of the Court in Robbins could not reach agreement on
this issue. In Robbins, California Highway Patrol officers stopped an
erratic driver of a station wagon. After one of the officers asked the
driver of the stopped automobile, who had walked towards the patrol
car, for his driver's license and the automobile's registration, W th~
driver" fumbled with his wallet. ,,216 Apparently the driver then returned
to his automobile (the plurality's opinion is unclear on this point) accom~
panied by one of the officers and opened the door to get the automobile's
registration. When he opened the door, the officer noticed the odor of
burnt marijuana. An officer then patted down the automobile's owner,
discovering and seizing a vial of liquid. He searched the interior of the
station wagon, and discovered marijuana, as well as equipment for using

212. 442 U.S. at 764 n. 13.
In United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982), the Court limited the implications orthis stllll;1ment to searches of automobiles under the automobile exception where police have probllbl~ cIIYS~
to believe that a seizable item is in the personal luggage or container whose warrantless op~ni!ll! am!
inspection is at issue. See infra notes 250-321 and accompanying text. See (lIsa United SIllies y,
Monclavo-Cruz, 662 F.2d 1285 (9th Cir. 1981). (Chadwick precludes police from openinl! !lnQ
inventorying the contents of "personal baggage" such as purses that are discovered dllrlng an Invl,ln=
tory search of an automobile pursuant to South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 <i976).) Cf,
United States v. Modica, 663 F.2d 1173 (2d Cir. 1981) (fourth amendment's protection dpes oPt
apply to articles the finding of which in an automobile made the automobile subject tl) stllnngrY
forfeiture, because defendant lost any expectation of privacy as to that article once It was sell"eli),
The Sanders Court did not address the issue of whether the suitcase could have been s~lIn:h~d
without a warrant as incident to the lawful arrest of its owner, although the Court did state thaI it
"appears that the [suitcase) was not within his 'immediate control' at the time of the sellrch, " 442
U.S. at 763 n. II. Consequently, the Court did not address the application of Chadwick 's e"c)!lsive
control standard to the search of luggage or other containers discovered within an area within. the
immediate control of an arrestee during a warrantless search of that area incident tp a lawflllIIrre§t.
Cf. supra notes 36-42 and accompanying text.
213. 453 U.S. 420 (1981).
214. 456 U.S. 798 (1982).
215. In this situation, such a request is lawful without a warrant. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440
U.S. 648 (1979).
216. 453 U.S. at 422.
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it. Then, after placing the automobile's driver in their patrol car, 217 the
officers opened the tailgate of the station wagon and lifted up a handle set
flush in the deck, revealing a recessed luggage compartment. The officers
discovered inside this compartment two packages, each about the size of
an "oversized, extra-long cigar box with slightly rounded corners and
edges.' ,218 The packages were wrapped in green opaque plastic and sealed
on the outside with at least one strip of opaque tape. 219 Without a warrant, the officers unwrapped these two packages and discovered about 15
pounds of marijuana in each. The station wagon's owner was convicted
of various drug offenses after his motion to suppress the marijuana as
evidence was denied by the trial court. Six members of the Court agreed
that the warrantless opening of the two packages in which marijuana was
found, and the warrantless seizure of this marijuana, violated the fourth
amendment, but a majority could not agree on the legal principles or the
reasoning supporting this judgment.
Justice Stewart, in a plurality opinion joined by Justices Brennan,
White, and Marshall, although assuming that the warrantless stopping
and search of the station wagon itself was permissible under the
automobile exception, 220 concluded that Chadwick and Sanders prohibit
the warrantless opening of such closed containers as the two packages
wrapped in green opaque plastic at issue in Robbins, even though the
containers are discovered during a search of an automobile permissible in
scope under the automobile exception. 221 Justice Stewart rejected
217. The patdown and seizure of the vial and the placing of the driver in the patrol car may
arguably have constituted a lawful arrest of the driver and a lawful search of the driver's person incident to that arrest, see supra note 24, such that the warrantless search of the station wagon arguably
may have been permissible as a search incident to a lawful arrest under New York v. Belton, see
supra notes 59-149 and accompanying text. However, the State in Robbins did not argue that the
subsequent warrantless search of the interior of the station wagon and containers therein was incident to the lawful custodial arrest of the station wagon's driver. 453 U.S. at 429 n. 3.
218. [d. at 422 n. I (citation omitted).
219. [d. at 422 and 422 n. 1.
220. [d. at 423. See supra notes 150-51 and accompanying text. Justice Stewart did not address
the issue of whether the search of the recessed luggage compartment in the rear of the station wagon,
after marijuana had been found in the wagon's passenger compartment, exceeded the permissible
scope of a warrantless search of an automobile under the automobile exception. Justice Rehnquist
implied in dissent in Robbins that the search of the recessed luggage compartment
was permissible, because of the attendant circumstances: while the officers were retrieving the marijuana and other drug paraphernalia from the front of the car, the defendant said, "What you are
looking for is in the back." 453 U.S. at 442 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). (Justice Stewart did not
mention or analyze these facts in his plurality opinion in Robbins). See supra notes 190-91 and
accompanying text.
221. 453 U.S. at 428-29.
Prior to Robbins, the vast majority of lower federal and state courts had held that the fourth
amendment protects closed containers, but not open containers. See United States v. Cleary, 656
F.2d 1302, 1307 (9th Cir. 1981) (Wright, J., dissenting).
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arguments that Chadwick and Sanders require warrants only for the
search of such "containers commonly used to transport 'personal
effects' "222 as "sturdy" luggage (including suitcases), briefcases, duffle
bags, backpacks, and tote bags,223 but permit warrantless searches of
flimsier containers, such as cardboard boxes, paper bags, and plastic
bags. 224 The Justice asserted that the fourth amendment, as interpreted
in Chadwick and Sanders, prohibits the warrantless opening of any
closed opaque container, 22 S whether the container is "personal" or
"impersonal, "226 because such containers "reasonably 'manifested an
expectation that the contents would remain free from public examination.' , '227 He did refer approvingly, however, to dicta in footnote 13 of
Sanders to the effect that a warrantless search of a container is permitted
if the contents of the container can be inferred from the container's
shape, including, for example, a kit of burglar's tools or a gun case, 228 or
if the contents of the container are in "plain view. "229 Justice Stewart
asserted that "in short, the negative implication of footnote 13 of the
Sanders opinion is that, unless the container is such that its contents may
be said to be in plain view, those contents are fully protected by the
Fourth Amendment. ,,230 Justice Stewart then applied this reasoning to
the facts in Robbins, concluding that the evidence presented at the defen-

222. 453 U.S. at 425-26.
223. [d.
224. [d. at 426.
Such a distinction, which has been referred to as the "worthy container" rule, United States v.
Ross, 655 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1981), rev'd, 456 U.S. 798 (1982), had been followed by a number of
lower courts prior to Robbins. See cases cited in Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. at 426.
225. 453 U.S. at 426.
226. [d.
227. [d., quoting United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. I, II (1977). Justice Stewart appeared to
be arguing here that the opening by police of a closed, opaque container is a fourth amendment
search. See supra note 6, and see infra notes 298-319 and accompanying text.
228. 442 U.S. at 764 n.l3. See supra notes 209-12 and accompanying text. According to Justice
Stewart in Robbins, a container also would be within this exception under Chadwick if the container
is transparent or otherwise reveals its contents. 453 U.S. at 428.
229. 442 U.S. at 764 n. 13. See supra notes 207-10 and accompanying text. Justice Stewart
argued that to be within Sanders' plain view exception, a container must not be closed. 453 U.S. at
427. He also asserted that "expectations of privacy are established by general social norms, and to
fall within the ... [Sanders plain view) exception ... a container must so clearly announce its contents, whether by its distinctive configuration, its transparency, or otherwise, that its contents are
obvious to an observer." [d. at 428. He argued that the first exception under Sanders is "little more
than another variation of the 'plain view' exception, since, if the distinctive configuration of a container proclaims its contents, the contents cannot fairly be said to have been removed from a searching officer's view .... " /d. at 427.
230. [d.
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dant's trial did not "reliably" indicate that the green plastic used to wrap
the two packages "could only contain marijuana, "231 and, conse-

231. [d. at 428. Justice Stewart stated that the testimony at the defendant's trial of one of the
officers who searched the defendant's automobile was "vague" and "somewhat" obscure, and did
not establish that marijuana is ordinarily packaged as were the two packages in question. [d. (In the
quoted testimony that Justice Stewart found to be vague, the officer, in response to a question as to
whether there was anything about the two packages which attracted his attention, stated: "I had
previous knowledge of transportation of such blocks. Normally contraband is wrapped this way,
merely heresay [sic). I had never seen them before." The officer then replied "yes" when asked:
"You had heard contraband was packaged this way?" [d. Justice Rehnquist noted in dissent in Robbins, id. at 442, that after the officers had found marijuana in the passenger compartment of the station wagon, the defendant said to the officer: "What you are looking for is in the back." (Justice
Stewart did not refer to this fact in his opinion in Robbins.) Justice Rehnquist argued that this
remark by the defendant, combined with the testimony at the defendant's trial of one of the officers
who searched the defendant's station wagon that he was aware that contraband was often wrapped
in plastic garbage bags, as were the two packages in question, created a permissible inference as to
the contents of the two packages and denied the defendant a reasonable expectation of privacy in the
contents of the two packages, with the result that their contents could be inspected without a warrant. [d.
It might be argued that Justice Stewart meant that if the police have probable cause or reason to
believe that the contents of a container, although not in plain view, are seizable items because they
have a nexus with criminal activity, they may not only seize the container without a warrant but may
also open and inspect the contents of the container without a warrant. Such an interpretation,
however, is precluded by the determination in United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982) that Chadwick and Sanders govern the legality of a warrantless search of a container discovered in an
automobile during a lawful automobile exception search when the container's contents are not in
plain view and when the police have probable cause to believe there are seizable items within the container. See infra notes 250-321 and accompanying text.
In Blairv. United States, 665 F.2d 500, 507 (4th Cir. 1981), the court concluded that this plain
view exception actually contains two parts. "First, if the container is open and its contents exposed,
its contents can be said to be in plain view. Second, if a container proclaims its contents by its distinctive configuration or otherwise and thus allows by its outward appearance an inference to be made
of its contents, these contents are similarly considered to be in plain view .... In either instance, an
investigating authority need not obtain a warrant to search the container, the reasoning behind the
exception being that a warrant under those circumstances would be superfluous." Marijuana in
burlap-covered bales on a vessel was held to be in plain view within the meaning of Robbins by the
majority in Blair, because some of the bales were split open and marijuana exposed to view prior to
the opening and sampling of the bales by law enforcement officials, because the other bales were
almost identical in appearance to those that were split open, and because some of these other bales
had marijuana residue on top of them. Thus authorities had sufficient evidence to infer "that the
bales not split open also contained marijuana." [d. at 507. Judge Murnagham, dissenting in part
and concurring in part in Blair, argued that the evidence established that bales were broken open by
government agents, not by the occupants of the vessel, and that they were not broken open until the
day after they were seized. [d. at 512 n. II (Murnagham, J., dissenting in part and concurring in
part). He also argued that to be in plain view under the plurality opinion in Robbins, a package must
be open or have a configuration that is distinctive as to its contents, and that the contents of a
package are not in plain view under the Robbins plurality opinion when the police have probable
cause to believe that the contents of a package are seizable items, but the contents are not' 'revealed
to the naked eye." Id. at 513. Applying this test to the facts, he concluded that the marijuana in the
bales in question was not in plain view. [d. at 513-14.
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quently, that the marijuana inside the closed, opaque containers could
not be opened without a warrant under Chadwick and Sanders. 232
Chief Justice Burger concurred in the judgment in Robbins but did
not issue an opinion explaining his reasons for concurring. 233 His majority opinion in Chadwick, and his concurring opinion in Sanders,
however, indicate that he would apply Chadwick's exclusive control standard to personal property other than personal luggage. In his opinion in
Chadwick, he referred not only to luggage, but also to "personal possessions,"234 "other personal property,"23~ and "letters and sealed
packages"236 as containers that generally require a warrant before they
can be opened and inspected. The Chief Justice, in his concurring
opinion in Sanders, referred to "receptacle, "237 in addition to "trunk"
and "suitcase," in discussing the application of Chadwick's exclusive
control standard. Although these references in Chadwick and Sanders do
not make explicitly clear how Chief Justice Burger would apply
Chadwick's exclusive control standard to the various types of personal
property and containers, they do indicate that he would generally require
warrants to open at least some type of containers of personal property
other than suitcases and luggage.
Justice Powell also concurred in the Robbins judgment, but indicated that he would permit warrantless searches of some types of
containers that Justice Stewart would prohibit. Justice Powell argued
that a warrant should be required to open and examine the contents of a
container only if the container is one that generally serves as a repository
for personal effects, or is an opaque, closed and sealed container
manifesting an actual and reasonable expectation of privacy. 238 He
expressed disagreement with the theory advocated in Justice Stewart's
plurality opinion, which would, he asserted, require a warrant to open
and inspect the contents of any closed, opaque container, regardless of its
size or shape, or other evidence suggesting that the container's owner was
asserting a privacy interest in the contents. 239 Justice Powell argued that
his approach "resembles in principle the inquiry courts must undertake
232. None of the Justices in Robbins argued that the two packages were not in the exclusive
control of the police or that there were exigent circumstances present; in either of these situations,
under Chadwick and Sanders, a warrant would not have been required to open the two packages.
See supra notes 36-58 and 195-212 and accompanying text.
233. 453 U.S. at 429.
234. 433 U.S. at II.
235. Id. at 15.
236. Id. at 10 (quoting Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733 (1878».
237. 442 U.S. at 767.
238. 453 U.S. at 432-33.
239. Id. at 429 n.!.
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to determine whether a search violates the Fourth Amendment rights of a
complaining party,,,240 but that Justice Stewart's approach "departs
from this basic concern with interests in privacy, and adopts a mechanical
requirement for a warrant before police may search any closed
container."241 According to Justice Powell, application of Justice
Stewart's approach would result in the unjustified expenditure of time
and effort of police and magistrates in obtaining warrants authorizing
the search of the "most trivial container, ,,242 such as a "cigar box" or "a
Dixie cup, ,,243 and the detention in some cases of suspects and vehicles
for "hours. ,,244
Justice Powell indicated that he would not require the police to have
a warrant to inspect the contents of a plastic cup or a brown paper grocery
sack. 245 As noted earlier, Justice Stewart and the three other members of
the plurality had indicated that they would require a warrant to search a
closed paper bag. 246 Justice Powell indicated, on the other hand, that
cardboard boxes and laundry bags are ambiguous containers which may
or may not, depending upon the circumstances of each case, manifest a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of the container. 247
Under his approach, a court, in determining whether a warrant is needed
to inspect the contents of an ambiguous container, should consider' 'the
size, shape, material, and condition of the exterior, the context within
which it is discovered, and whether the possessor had taken some significant precaution, such as locking, securely sealing, or binding the container, that indicates a desire to prevent the contents from being
displayed upon simple mischance. ,,248 Applying this test to the facts in
Robbins, Justice Powell argued that a reasonable expectation of privacy
had been manifested in the two packages in question, because they had
been securely wrapped and sealed, and, therefore, that a warrant was
required to open and inspect the contents of the two packages. 249
240. [d. at 432.
241. [d. at 433.
242. [d. at 433-34.
243. [d. at 433.
244. [d.
245. [d. at 434 n.3.
246. 453 U.S. at 426. In Ross v. United States, 456 U.S. 798 (1982), the Court was required to
determine if a warrant is required to open and inspect the contents of a closed paper bag. See infra
notes 250-321 and accompanying text.
247. 453 U.S. at 434 n. 3.
248. /d. at 435.
249. /d. Justice Powell indicated that he might be willing in the future to adopt the viewpoint of
the three dissenters (Justices Blackmun, Rehnquist and Stevens) that police, under the automobile
exception, should be permitted to open and inspect the contents of every container found within an
automobile. He declined to do so, because the "parties have not pressed this argument in this case

54

GMU LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 6: 1

Less than a year after Robbins, a majority of the Supreme Court, in
United States v. Ross,2S0 rejected "the precise holding in Robbins"2S1
and the approaches used by Justices Stewart and Powell to determine
when the opening and inspection of a particular container are regulated
by the fourth amendment. Ross held that under the automobile exception, when police have the right to make a warrantless search of an
automobile they have probable cause to believe contains seizable items
but do not know where in the automobile the items will be found, they
may search without a warrant all areas of the automobile and all containers therein which could contain the items. In Ross, the police had
probable cause, based on an informant's tip, to believe that the
defendant's automobile contained narcotics in the trunk, although the
informant did not identify a specific container in which the narcotics
would be found. 252 Soon after receiving this tip, the police stopped the
and it is late in the term for us to undertake sua sponte reconsideration of basic doctrines." Jd. at
435. Justice Powell did, in fact, change his position in this manner less than a year later, by concurring and joining in the Court's opinion in United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982). See infra
notes 250-321 and accompanying text.
Justice Stevens argued in dissent in Robbins that, because police obtain a warrant authorizing
them to search any container in an automobile when they have probable cause to believe seizable
items are hidden in them, then, under the automobile exception, the police should be allowed to conduct such a search without a warrant. 453 U.S. at 444 (Stevens, J., dissenting). He argued that "the
scope of any search that is within the exception should be just as broad as a magistrate could
authorize by warrant if he were on the scene; the automobile exception to the warrant requirement
therefore justifies neither more nor less than could a magistrate's warrant." Jd. at 448-49. He stated,
however, that this container rule should apply only when the police have probable cause to believe
that a seizable item will be found somewhere in an automobile, but not when the police have probable cause to believe that the seizable item is in a specific container in the automobile (which, he
noted, was the case in Chadwick and Sanders). Jd. at 449. He implied that the automobile exception
should apply only when the police have probable cause to believe that an item is located somewhere
in the automobile, but not when the police have probable cause to believe that the item is located in a
specific container. Jd. Justice Stevens' dissent in Robbins became the position of a majority of the
Court less than one year later in United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982). See infra notes 250-321
and accompanying text.
Justice Rehnquist argued in dissent in Robbins, as he had argued in New York v. Belton, 453
U.S. 454, 463 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting), that Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), should be
overruled so that the States would no longer be subject to the exclusionary rule. 453 U.S. at 437-39.
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
250. 456 U.S. 798 (1982).
251. Jd. at 824.
252. Jd. at 817 n.22. The Court, however, did not address the question of whether the informant's tip satisfied the probable cause standard that was applicable at the time - the "twopronged" basis of knowledge and veracity requirements of Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964),
and Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969). See Moylan, Hearsay and Probable Cause: An
Aguilar and Spinelli Primer, 25 MERCER L. REV. 741 (1974). The Court subsequently decided to
"abandon the 'two-pronged test' established by our decisions in Aguilar and Spinelli, "Illinois v.
Gates, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2332 (1983), adopting in its place a less strict' 'totality of the circumstances
analysis" for determining when there is probable cause to believe that seizable items will be found in
a particular place. Id.
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automobile without a warrant on a public street and arrested the defendant. 253 They then searched the trunk, in which they found a brown
paper bag. A police officer opened the bag and discovered in it severa1
glassine bags containing a white powder that a police laboratory later
determined to be heroin. 254 At the police station, the police, still without
a warrant, discovered in the trunk a zippered red leather pouch. They
opened the pouch and discovered $3,200 in cash, which they seized. The
defendant was charged with the crime of posession of heroin with intent
to distribute, a violation of 21 U .S.C. § 841(a) (1976). Prior to his trial,
the defendant made a motion to suppress as evidence the heroin seized
from the paper bag and the money seized from the leather pouch. The
district court denied this motion, after which the defendant was convicted of the crime.
A majority of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, sitting en
banc, held that the warrantless opening and inspection of the contents of
both the paper bag and the leather pouch violated the fourth
amendment. 255 The court justified its holding on the grounds that warrants are generally required, and that there is no exception to this rule that
would permit the warrantless opening and inspection of "unworthy"
containers. The majority further argued that determining the validity of a
warrantless search of a container on the basis of the container's durability would impose "an unreasonable and unmanageable burden
on police and courts, ,,256 and that the fourth amendment should protect

253. The Court in Ross did not discuss whether the exigent circumstances requirement of the
automobile exception was satisfied. The Court, however, has always found this requirement to be
satisfied when police stop an automobile on a public road, even when the police have probable cause
to believe that the automobile would be found in a specific location (see supra note 159 and accompanying text, and Husty v. United States, 282 U.S. 694 (1931), discussed therein) as was the case in
Ross, 456 U.S. at 801.
254. [d. The Court in Ross did not discuss the issue of whether the seizure of the heroin complied with the plain view seizure doctrine, see supra note 57. Arguably, the immediately apparent
requirement of the plain view seizure doctrine may not have been satisfied, because the facts of Ross
indicate that the white powder was not determined to be heroin until tested later by a police
laboratory. See supra note 57.
255. 655 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
This decision followed an unreported decision by a divided three-judge panel of the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. United States v. Ross, No. 79-1624 (D.C. Cir.
April 17, 1980). This decision was later vacated and a rehearing en bane was held on October 23,
1980. United States v. Ross, 655 F.2d 1159, 1161 n. 3 (D.C. Cir. 1981). The three-judge panel
concluded that the fourth amendment validity of the warrantless search of a container discovered
during an automobile exception search depends on whether the owner possesses a reasonable expectation of privacy in its contents. Applying this test, the majority of the panel held that the
warrantless opening and inspection of the contents of the leather pouch violated the fourth amendment, but that the opening and inspection of the contents of the paper bag did not. [d.
256. [d. at 1161.
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all persons, not just persons "with the resources or fastidiousness to
place their effects in containers that decision makers would rank in
the luggage line."m The majority rejected the argument that the warrantless searches of the paper bag and leather pouch were valid because
the warrantless search of the automobile was permissible under the
automobile exception.
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the warrantless opening
and inspection of the contents of the paper bag and leather pouch did not
exceed the permissible scope of a warrantless search of an automobile
under the automobile exception. Justice Stevens, in an opinion joined by
the Chief Justice and four other Associate Justices, reasoned that the
automobile exception permits police, when they have probable cause to
believe only that seizable items are located somewhere in the automobile,
to search without a warrant all areas of the automobile and containers
within the automobile within which the items could be hidden.258 He
stated, however, that "probable cause to believe that a container placed
in the trunk of a taxi contains contraband or evidence does not justify a
search of the entire cab."m Justice Stevens explained that the permissible scope of a warrantless search under the automobile exception' 'is no
greater than a magistrate could have authorized by issuing a warrant
based on the probable cause that justified the search, ,,260 and that in
previous automobile exception cases before the Supreme Court and
lower federal courts it had never been argued or held, until Chadwick,
Sanders, and Robbins, that police could not open and inspect containers
discovered within areas of an automobile lawfully searched under the
automobile exception. 261
He further indicated that permitting a warrantless search of the vehicle itself (including its upholstery) while prohibiting the warrantless
opening and inspection of the contents of all wrapped articles found
within the vehicle "would actually exacerbate the intrusion on privacy

257. [d.

258. Justice Stevens indicated that under the automobile exception, police, in addition to
searching containers found within the automobile, may rip open upholstery without a warrant, 456
U.S. at 818, 823 (at least when the upholstery feels harder than is ordinarily the case, id. at 804
quoting from Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. at 174), and may also search concealed or hidden
compartments, 456 U.S. at 818,825, and the glove compartment. [d. at 821, 823.
259. [d. at 824.
260. [d. at 818. Justice Stevens also stated that the Court's holding "neither broadened nor
limited the scope of a lawful search based on probable cause," id. at 820. He noted that a search warrant explicitly authorizing only the search of a building permits a search of desks, chests, cabinets,
and drawers, and that a warrant authorizing search of a vehicle permits' 'a search of every part of the
vehicle that might contain the object of the search." [d. at 821.
261. [d. at 819.
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interests"262 and would interfere with the "prompt and efficient completion" of the search of the vehicle.263 He reasoned here that "the
vehicle would need to be secured while a warrant was obtained,,,264
since "until the container itself was opened the police could never be
certain that the contraband was not secreted in a yet undiscovered portion of the vehicle. ,,265
It could be argued contra, however, that although exigent circumstances may justify the warrantless stopping and search of an
automobile and the seizure of containers found therein, a warrant should
be required to search such containers once they are within the exclusive
control of the police 266 unless exigent circumstances are present. 267 As
noted by Justice Marshall in his dissent in Ross, 268 although integral compartments of a car are just as mobile as the car, moveable containers
located within the car are not, and do not present the same practical problems of safekeeping as does the car. The rule adopted by the majority in
Ross does not allow police searching an automobile to make a warrantless search greater in scope than would be permitted by a warrant.
Still, there remains the danger noted by Justice Marshall in his dissent: 269
if probable cause is determined after, rather than prior to, the opening
and inspection of the contents of a container, probable cause will be
found in borderline situations where highly probative items were seized
during the warrantless search of the container, even though information
available prior to the search would have been insufficient for such a find262. [d. at 821 n.28.
263. [d. at 821.
264. [d. at 821 n.28.
265. [d. Justice Marshall argued in dissent that the police would only have to seize the container while a warrant is being obtained, id. at 831 (Marshall, J., dissenting). He failed to note,
as did the majority in Ross, that the car would also have to be detained until the container was
searched, because of the possibility that the items to be seized were in unsearched areas of the car
rather than in the container. Justice Marshall also stated that police could continue to search a car
for seizable items even though a container was found to have seizable items inside, id. at 838, but
cited no authority for this position. See supra notes 190-91 and accompanying text. He did state later
in his dissent that "if police open a container within a car and find contraband, they may acquire
probable cause to believe that other portions of the car, and other containers within it, will contain
contraband," id. at 842 n. 14 (Marshall, J., dissenting)(which would allow such other portions and
containers to be searched without a warrant, see supra note 200 and accompanying text), but he did
not explain how such probable cause would be acquired. See supra note 191.
266. See supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text.
267. See supra notes 44-45, 205 and accompanying text.
Justice Marshall argued in his dissent in Ross that no exigent circumstances were present in the
case because Ross had been arrested and was in custody when both searches at issue occurred and
because the police succeeded in transporting the bag to the station without inadvertently spilling its
contents. 456 U.S. at 835.
268. [d. at 837-38.
269. [d. at 829.
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ing. Justice Marshall also argued that the majority erred in permitting the
scope of a warrantless search under the automobile exception to be as
broad as the scope of a search authorized by a magistrate pursuant to a
warrant. He noted that "an officer on the beat who searches an
automobile without a warrant is not entitled to conduct a broader search
than the exigency obviating the warrant justifies, ,,270 but he failed to note
that, although the general rule is that warrantless searches and seizures
are permitted only when exigent circumstances are present/ 71 warrantless searches and seizures are permitted in some circumstances when
exigent circumstances are not present if the interests served by such warrantless searches sufficiently outweigh the infringements upon privacy
interests resulting therefrom. Such warrantless searches do not violate
the fourth amendment. 272 Although exigent circumstances may not be
present in most cases when the warrantless opening and inspection of
containers take place under the holding of Ross, that case may authorize
searches reasonable under the fourth amendment under this balancing
test, because, as argued by Justice Blackmun 273 and Powell 274 in their
concurring opinion, it provides clear guidance to police, courts, and the
public as to the authority of police to act without a warrant under the
automobile exception, while interfering only to a limited extent with a
person's privacy. 275
The Supreme Court also said in Ross that "the Fourth Amendment
provides protection to the owner of every container that conceals its contents from plain view. ,,276 This statement authorizes the warrantless

270. [d. at 833.
271. See supra notes 1-5 and accompanying text.
272. See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976) (warrantless stopping of an
automobile and brief investigative questioning of occupants by immigration officials at fixed checkpoint away from international border, when there was no reason to believe the automobile contained illegal aliens, upheld as not in violation of the fourth amendment because law enforcement
needs outweighed minimal intrusions on privacy); Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594 (1981)
(warrantless administrative inspection searches of "pervasively regulated" industries pursuant to
statutory authorization permitted when there is clear notice of when and under what procedures
such searches will take place.)
273. 456 U.S. at 825 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
274. [d. at 826 (Powell, J., concurring).
275. Such an argument is similar to that of the majority of the Supreme Court in New York v.
Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981), in support of its per se rule authorizing the warrantless search of the
passenger compartment of an automobile and the containers therein when that search is incident to
the lawful arrest of an occupant of the automobile. See supra notes 82-91 and accompanying text.
276. 456 U.S. at 822-23. Justice Stevens did not explain when the contents of a container would
be in plain view, but the reference is probably meant to refer to the definition of this term in Justice
Stewart's plurality opinion in Robbins, 453 U.S. at 427 (plurality opinion), which Justice Stevens
identified as the source of his conclusion that the fourth amendment applies to all containers that
conceal their contents from plain view. See supra notes 215-32 and accompanying text.
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search of all containers within an automobile under the automobile
exception, regardless of whether the container is "worthy" or
"unworthy" even when the police have probable cause only to believe
that the items to be seized are somewhere in the car, but not in any specific
container within the automobile. 277 This overrules Robbins.278 Justice
Stevens' opinion in Ross also implicitly rejects Justice Powell's approach
in Robbins on the issue of when the fourth amendment regulates the
opening and inspection of containers, when it states that "the central
purpose of the Fourth Amendment forecloses ... a distinction"279
which is "based on the proposition that the Fourth Amendment protects
only those containers that objectively manifest an individual's reasonable expectation of privacy. ,,280 The Court noted that if such a distinction were adopted, "the propriety of a warrantless search necessarily
would turn on much more than the fabric of the container. A paper bag
stapled shut and marked 'private' might be found to manifest a
reasonable expectation of privacy, as could a cardboard box stacked on
top of two pieces of heavy luggage. The propriety of the warrantless
search seemingly would turn on an objective appraisal of all the surrounding circumstances. ,,281 By rejecting a "reasonable expectation of
privacy" test for determining the application ofthe fourth amendment to
the opening and inspection of the contents of containers, the majority in
Ross implicitly rejected Justice Powell's concurring opinion in Robbins,
which advocated such a test. 282 In support of the conclusion that the
fourth amendment foreclosed a distinction between worthy and
unworthy containers and a test based on an objective appraisal of all surrounding circumstances, Justice Stevens in Ross stated that "just as the
most frail cottage in the kingdom is absolutely entitled to the same
guarantees of privacy as the most majestic mansion, so also maya

277. [d. at 822. Although the Court in Ross did not say so, the effect of this statement is to
make the containers subject to search under Ross pursuant to the automobile exception identical to
those subject to search under New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981), pursuant to the search incident to a lawful arrest exception. See supra notes 66-72 and accompanying text.
278. As noted by Justice Marshall in his dissent in Ross, the application of this definition of
containers subject to the fourth amendment's protection to the rule adopted in Ross results in a loss
by all citizens of the protection of the fourth amendment's warrant requirement. 456 U.S. at 843.
(Marshall, J., dissenting). On the other hand, the Ross Court's holding with respect to the fourth
amendment's applicability to containers extends the protection of the fourth amendment's warrant
requirement in other contexts. See supra note 226 and accompanying text.
279. 456 U.S. at 822.
280. [d. at 822 n. 30.
281. [d.
282. See supra notes 238-49 and accompanying text. Justice Powell also implicitly rejected his
concurring opinion in Robbins by concurring in Justice Stevens' majority opinion in Ross.
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traveler who carries a toothbrush and a few articles of clothing in a paper
bag or knotted scarf claim an equal right to conceal his possessions from
official inspection as the sophisticated executive with the locked attache
case. ,,283 Although Justice Stevens in Ross rejected Justice Powell's case
by case approach in Robbins, he did note that "the protection afforded
by the Fourth Amendment varies in different settings. "284 More
specifically, he stated that "an individual's expectation of privacy in a
vehicle and its contents may not survive if probable cause is given to
believe that the vehicle is transporting contraband. Certainly the privacy
interests in a car's trunk or glove compartment may be no less than those
in a movable container. An individual undoubtedly has a significant
interest that the upholstery of his automobile will not be ripped or a hidden compartment within it opened. These interests must yield to the
authority of a search, however, which-in light of Carroll-does not
require the prior approval of a magistrate. ,,28S
The Court in Ross did adhere to the holding in Sanders, 286
distinguishing Chadwick and Sanders, in which cases the police had
probable cause to believe that seizable items were located in the locked
footlocker and the suitcase, respectively, from Ross, wherein the police
had probable cause to believe only that the seizable items were located
somewhere in the automobile's trunk, but did not have reason to
believe that the seizable items were located in any specific container. 287
Justice Stevens, in fact, approvingly quoted and adopted Chief Justice
Burger's argument in his concurring opinion in Sanders 288 to the effect
that the automobile exception under Carroll was not applicable to the
facts in Sanders. Consequently, because the fourth amendment
regulates the opening and inspection of any container discovered within

283. 456 U.S. at 822 (footnote omitted).
284. Justice Stevens elaborated on this statement as follows:
The luggage carried by a traveler entering the country may be searched at random by a
customs officer; the luggage may be searched no matter how great the traveler's desire
to conceal the contents may be. A container carried at the time of arrest often may be
searched without a warrant and even without any specific suspicion concerning its contents. A container that may conceal the object of a search authorized by a warrant may be
opened immediately; the individual's interest in privacy must give way to the magistrate's
official determination of probable cause.
456 U.S. at 823.
285. [d.
286. [d. at 824. See supra note 196 and accompanying text.
287. [d. at 816. See United States v. Place, 51 U.S.L.W. 4844, 4845 n.3 (U.S. June 20,1983)
(the Court's holding in Sanders that " ... the police violated the Fourth Amendment in immediately
searching the luggage rather than first obtaining a warrant authorizing the search ... was not
affected by ... United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982).")
288. 442 U.S. at 766-67. See supra note 196.
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an automobile (provided its contents are not in plain view),289 police
will continue to need a warrant to open and inspect the contents of a
container they have probable cause to believe contains seizable items
and whose contents are not in plain view 290 unless the container is not
within the exclusive control of the police 291 or there are exigent circumstances present. 292
Furthermore, because Ross' holding with respect to the fourth
amendment's applicability to the opening and inspection of the contents
of containers is not limited to the specific factual situations involved in
that case, it implicitly extends the Chadwick and Sanders exclusive control and exigent circumstances standards to containers whose contents
are not in plain view when they are discovered within the area of immediate control of a person lawfully arrested. 293 The Court in Ross,
however, did not cite or discuss the applicability of its holding to the rule
established in Belton 294 that authorized the warrantless search of all containers within the passenger compartment of an automobile when an
occupant has been lawfully arrested. 295 The definition of container under
Belton, however, is identical to the definition of container under Ross. 296
Some aspects of Justice Powell's approach in his concurring opinion
in Robbins, such as the requirement that a container be sealed as well as
closed in order to be protected by the fourth amendment 297 and the statement that the opening of a paper bag never requires a warrant, 298 will not
receive universal acceptance. On the other hand, his approach to determine when the opening of a container and the inspection of its contents
will be considered to violate a legitimate expectation of privacy and thus

289. The determination in Ross that the fourth amendment regulates the opening and inspection of the contents of any container, whether worthy or unworthy, whose contents are not in plain
view, was not limited to the situation presented by the facts in Ross, but appears to be intended to
apply to all situations where the legality of the search of a container is at issue. See infra notes 291-94
and accompanying text.
290. See supra notes 228-31 and accompanying text.
291. See supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text.
292. See supra notes 44-45, 205 and accompanying text.
Justice Marshall asserted in his dissent in Ross that Ross requires the Government to "show
that the investigating officer knew enough but not too much, that he had sufficient knowledge to
establish probable cause but insufficient knowledge to know exactly where the contraband was
located." 456 U.S. at 840 (Marshall, J., dissenting)(quoting United States v. Ross, 655 F.2d 1159,
1202 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (en banc) (Wilkey, J., dissenting».
293. See supra notes 36-58 and accompanying text.
294. 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
295. See supra notes 59-149 and accompanying text.
296. See supra note 275.
297. See supra note 238 and accompanying text.
298. See supra note 245 and accompanying text.
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constitute a fourth amendment search, might be better received. 299 This
approach focuses on the location of a container within an automobile
and the circumstances under which it was discovered by police, as well as
the nature and design of the container. This view is more consistent with
traditional fourth amendment principles than Justice Stevens' majority
opinion in Ross or Justice Stewart's plurality opinion in Robbins. In his
concurring opinion in Robbins, Justice Powell properly recognized that
the initial issue presented in such cases is whether the warrantless opening
and inspection of the contents of a container or other item of personal
property is a fourth amendment search (i.e., violates an actual and
reasonable expectation of privacy300), regardless of which exception to
the rule generally requiring a warrant justified the warrantless search of
the automobile in which the container was found. The fourth amendment "protects the right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures";301 containers or other items of personal property are not
themselves protected by the fourth amendment,302 as Justice Stewart's
opinion in Robbins implied. 303
Although the plurality opinion in Robbins refers to reasonable
expectations of privacy, 304 that opinion ultimately concluded that particular types of containers and items of personal property-closed, opaque
containers-are protected by the fourth amendment, 30S regardless of the
circumstances present at the time the container is seized and searched. 306
Justice Stevens' majority opinion in Ross, although it referred to the
fourth amendment's protection for "the owner of every container that
conceals its contents from plain view,' >307 adopted a per se rule making
the fourth amendment applicable to all containers whose contents are not
in plain view, regardless of "an objective appraisal of all the surrounding
circumstances. "308 Justice Stewart in Robbins, Justice Powell in Rob-

299. See supra note 3.
300. See supra note 6.
301. U.S. CONST. amend. IV (emphasis added).
302. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
303. Justice Stewart argued that the fourth amendment prohibits the warrantless opening of
any closed opaque container. See supra notes 225-27 and accompanying text. This theory focused
only on the nature of the container.
304. 453 U.S. at 426-28.
305. Id. at 428. See supra note 303.
306. Cj. Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 434 n. 3 (1981) (Powell, J., concurring), discussed supra notes 238-49 and accompanying text.
307. 456 U.S. at 822-23.
308. Id. 822 at n. 30.
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bins, 309 and Justice Stevens in his majority opinion in Ross, failed to consider that a person may have a reasonable or legitimate expectation that a
container will not be opened and its contents inspected in some circumstances, but not in other circumstances. For instance, a person has
no actual or legitimate expectation of privacy in property that he has
abandoned,31O with the result that governmental opening, inspection,
and seizing of the contents of an abandoned container discovered in an
abandoned automobile are not regulated by the fourth amendment. 311
Similarly, the majority of courts hold that a person has no legitimate
expectation of privacy in the contents of trash that has been set out on a
curb for collection and disposal, and a fourth amendment search
therefore does not occur if police open and inspect the contents of containers set out for trash. 312 By analogy, and as implied by Justice Powell's
reference in Robbins to "the context in which [an ambiguous container]
is discovered," 313 a person might legitimately have a greater expectation
of privacy in a container placed in a locked trunk or glove compartment
of an automobile than in a similar container placed on the seat of an
unlocked passenger compartment of an automobile with the windows
rolled down. 314 As noted by Justice Powell in Robbins, the determination
of whether the opening and inspection of the contents of a particular container constitutes a fourth amendment search should be based upon a
consideration of "the size, shape, material, and condition of the exterior
of the container, the context within which it is discovered, and whether
the possessor had taken some significant precaution, such as locking,
securing, sealing or binding that container, that indicates a desire to pre-

309. 453 U.S. at 454 n. 3 (1981) (Powell, J., concurring).
310. See W. LA FAVE, supra note 6, § 2.6 (b).
311. See id., § 2.5 (a).
312. E.g., United States v. Shelby, 573 F.2d 971 (7th Cir. 1981); United States v. Alden, 576
F.2d 772 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 855. A minority of courts hold that people have a
reasonable expectation that the contents of trash will be handled only by trash collectors, not
inspected by police; and will be mingled with other trash and incinerated or otherwise disposed of,
not retained and sifted by law enforcement officials. See People v. Krivda, 5 Cal. 3d 357, 96 Cal.
Rptr. 62, 486P.2d 1262 (1971), vacated and remanded, 409U.S. 33 (1972), aff'd after remand, 8 Cal.
3d 623,105 Cal. Rptr. 521, 504 P.2d 457 (1973), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 919 (1973). See W. LA FAVE,
supra note 6, § 2.6 (c).
313. 453 U.S. at 434 n. 3 (Powell, J., concurring).
314. Similarly, the majority of courts hold that a person has a legitimate expectation that police
will not look into the passenger compartment of an automobile parked within the curtilage of his
home, see, e.g., United States v. Bradshaw, 490 F.2d 1097 (4th Cir. 1974), but does not have a
legitimate expectation that police will not look into the inside of an automobile's passenger compartment when the automobile is located in a public place, e.g. Smith v. Slayton, 484 F.2d 1188 (4th Cir.
1973), even if the policeman's observations are made at night with the aid of a flashlight. E.g., State
v. Bell, 62 Wis. 2d 534, 215 N.W. 2d 535 (1974).
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vent the contents from being displayed upon simple mischance. ,,31 S This
approach should be followed regardless of whether the container in question was found during a warrantless search of an automobile pursuant to
the automobile exception, Belton's search incident to a lawful arrest
exception, or some other exception to the rule generally requiring a warrant for a search. It should be noted, however, that the exception that
justified the warrantless search of the automobile in question may be relevant to the determination of whether a person had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the container and its contents. 316
Justice Stewart's opinion in Robbins also failed to distinguish
between the issue of whether the opening and inspection of the contents
of a container is a fourth amendment search and the issue of whether such
conduct by the police without a warrant violates the fourth amendment.
Justice Stevens' analysis in Ross fails, as did Justice Stewart's analysis in
Robbins, to distinguish two superficially similar but actually distinct
issues. The first is whether the opening and inspection of the contents of a
container constitute a fourth amendment search; and the second is
whether such conduct is an unreasonable search that violates the fourth
amendment. The various situations cited by Justice Stevens in Ross as
examples of how the protection afforded by the fourth amendment varies
in different settings 317 are situations in which a search with or without a
warrant was held not to be unreasonable in violation of the fourth
amendment. They are not situations in which the police conduct was held
not to be a search within the meaning of the fourth amendment.
Only if the opening and inspection of the contents of a container are
determined to constitute a fourth amendment search is a court required

315. 453 U.S. at 434 n. 3 (Powell, J., concurring). See Sharpe v. United States, 660 F.2d 967
(4th Cir. 1981); Virgin Islands v. Rasool, 657 F.2d 585 (3d Cir. 1981); United States v. Pillo, 522
F .Supp. 855 (M.D. Pa. 1981). In addition, as noted earlier, see supra note 6, the opening and inspection of the contents of a container may violate one person's fourth amendment's rights, but not
those of a third party. See United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727 (I 980)(defendant in a criminal trial
does not have standing to challenge the admissibility of evidence obtained from a third person's
briefcase through an intentional violation of that third person's fourth amendment rights).
316. For example, the driver of an automobile who had robbed a bank, put the proceeds in a
paper bag, and put the bag in his car, should have a correspondingly lesser legitimate expectation of
privacy in that bag than the driver of an automobile arrested for speeding would have in the privacy
of the contents of paper bags discovered in the automobile during a search incident to his lawful
arrest under Belton. Cf Graham v. State, 47 Md. App. 287, 421 A.2d 1385 (thief of recently stolen
container has no legitimate expectation of privacy in that container and consequently has no standing to challenge police seizure and inspection of the contents of that container).
317. See supra no:.:s 284-85 and accompanying text.
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to determine if such police conduct was reasonable under the fourth
amendment, and if a warrant and probable cause were required and were
present if required. 318 If the opening and inspection of the contents of a
container by police do amount to a fourth amendment search, and such a
warrantless search is not lawful under Ross, the determination of
whether the search was reasonable under the fourth amendment should
be determined by application of Chadwick's and Sanders' exclusive control and exigent circumstances standards 319 regardless of whether the
container was discovered during an automobile exception search or a
search under Belton. The exigent circumstances that justify the warrantless stopping and seizure of an automobile,320 do not, however,
necessarily establish an exigency that justifies the warrantless search of a
container that is within the exclusive control of the police. 321

IV.

CONCLUSION

There can be cases where police officers without a search or arrest
warrant have probable cause to believe that an automobile contains
seizable items, under circumstances such that a warrantless stop and
search of the automobile is permissible under the automobile exception,
but where the occupants of the automobile cannot be arrested without a
warrant. 322 In such cases, because the occupants of the automobile cannot be arrested lawfully, the automobile cannot be searched without a
warrant incident to a lawful arrest under Chimel and Belton, although it
can be searched without a warrant under the automobile exception. 323

318. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979). If such police conduct is not a fourth amendment
search, such conduct is not regulated by the fourth amendment's reasonableness, warrant or probable cause requirements. [d.
319. See supra notes 36-58, 195-212 and accompanying text.
320. See supra notes 152-76 and accompanying text.
321. See supra notes 44-45, 205 and accompanying text. As noted earlier, see supra notes
195-212 and accompanying text, the Court in Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 766 (1979), ruled
that whether the warrantless opening and inspection of the contents of containers discovered in
an automobile were reasonable under the fourth amendment is determined by application of
the general rules developed under the fourth amendment's warrant clause and not the exception
to the rule.
322. An arrest warrant is required in many jurisdictions when the police have probable cause to
believe that the occupants committed a misdemeanor out of their presence. See W. LA FAVE, supra
note 6, § 5.1 (b), (c).
323. This was apparently the situation in Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925). See W.
LA FAVE, supra note 6, § 7.2(a) at 511.
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When a warrantless search of an automobile is permitted under the
automobile exception, a prompt search of the automobile may result in
the seizure of contraband or evidence, fruits, or instrumentalities of
crime that otherwise would not be recovered by law enforcement officials. When a warrantless search of an automobile is permitted under
Chimel and Belton because the occupants of the automobile have been
lawfully arrested, a warrantless search of the automobile may prevent the
loss of evidence or forestall injury to the arresting officers or members of
the public. The arrested occupants might, for example, reenter the
automobile to obtain evidence or weapons hidden inside. Consequently,
to prevent loss of evidence and other seizable items and to protect the
safety of police officers and members of the public, there are reasonable
grounds for recognizing these two independent exceptions to the rule
generally requiring a warrant for a search or seizure-the "automobile
exception", and Belton's search incident to a lawful arrest exception.
Under either of these two exceptions, the validity of a warrantless
search of an automobile should be decided on a case by case basis. The
validity of a warrantless search under the automobile exception should
depend on a finding of probable cause to believe there were seizable items
in the automobile and the presence of exigent circumstances that would
make it impracticable or dangerous for the police to have obtained a warrant. The validity of a warrantless search when incident to the lawful
arrest of one or more occupants of the automobile should depend on a
finding that there was a reasonable likelihood that the arrested
occupant(s) may have been able to enter the automobile and seize a
weapon or evidence prior to being transported to a police station or jail.
This determination should be based upon the number of arrested occupants, the number of arresting officers, the degree of physical restraint to
which the arrested occupants were subject at the time of the search, the
geographical location of the arrested occupants in relation to the
automobile at the time it was searched, and the design of the automobile
that was searched. Although the Belton and Ross rules may provide clearcut guidance to police as to their lawful authority and to members of the
public as to their constitutional rights, these rules also authorize searches
of areas of automobiles and containers in the automobile when there is
absolutely no danger that an occupant of the automobile or anyone else
could gain access to that area or container.
There are, however, practical alternatives to the Belton rule that
would protect the safety of the police and members of the public and
preserve evidence that may be in the automobile. They include authorizing police to handcuff all lawfully arrested occupants of an automobile
and lock the persons in a police vehicle; to take any containers found

1983)

WARRANTLESS SEARCHES AND SEIZURES OF AUTOMOBILES

67

within the automobile and temporarily lock them in the trunk of that
automobile or a police vehicle until a warrant is obtained or until the
arrested occupants are released from police custody; to lock the
automobile and have it towed to a police impoundment lot; and to have
one of the arresting officers (if there is more than one) or a police officer
in a back-up unit drive the automobile to a police impoundment lot. In
addition, for the purposes of protection of human safety and preservation of evidence, police also might be authorized to lock occupants of an
automobile not arrested in a police vehicle temporarily, or to otherwise
res~rain those occupants until after arrested occupants of the automobile
are removed from the scene or additional police officers arrive. A rule
authorizing such alternate types of warrantless conduct by police after
lawfully arresting occupants of an automobile would provide clear-cut
guidance both to the police and to the public as to the authority of the
police; would protect the safety of police and members of the public; and
would prevent evidence that may be in the automobile from being concealed, removed, or destroyed by arrested occupants, non-arrested occupants, or members of the public. Moreover, it would prevent unnecessary
invasions of personal privacy to a greater extent than does the Belton
rule, and would, therefore, be more consistent with the fourth amendment's prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures than is the rule
adopted in Belton.
Furthermore, the validity of police conduct in opening and inspecting without a warrant the contents of a container found within an
automobile during a lawful warrantless search under Belton should be
based on a determination of whether such conduct violated an actual and
legitimate expectation of privacy. That is, the validity of the conduct will
depend on whether it constituted a fourth amendment search, and, if so,
whether the police had the container within their exclusive control and
whether there were exigent circumstances.
On the other hand, in the case of an automobile exception search,
the standard adopted in Ross should determine the validity of a warrantless fourth amendment search of a container. The effect of this
would be that Ross would govern cases in which the police have probable
cause to believe only that seizable items are located somewhere in the
automobile, and Sanders would govern situations in which the police
have probable cause to believe the seizable item is in a specific container.
When Ross applies, it will be reasonable to allow police to open and
inspect without a warrant the contents of containers which could hold
seizable items, because the alternative of having police impound the
automobile and the containers until a search warrant is obtained would
place an unreasonable burden on police and magistrates, and would
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interfere with privacy interests to an equal or greater extent than would
the immediate warrantless search of the containers. Although there is the
danger under Ross that probable cause may be found after a search when
it would not be found prior to the search, neutral and detached
magistrates should be trusted to avoid such consequences.

